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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis seeks to understand at least one prevalent religious epistemology in the 
Churches of Christ by exploring the work of Thomas B. Warren. To accomplish this goal, 
I first offer a descriptive analysis of Warren’s theory of knowledge followed by an 
assessment of its strong and weak points. Ultimately finding his epistemology 
unsatisfying, I conclude the thesis by highlighting recent developments in religious 
epistemology that might point the way forward in accounting for knowledge of God in a 
theologically and philosophically robust way. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Introduction to the Question 
 
What are the conditions under which one can achieve knowledge of God? Over 
the past fifty years, this question has received renewed attention.1 This has led to new and 
philosophically interesting ways of addressing the conditions under which Christian 
belief can count as knowledge. Thinkers and theologians in the Churches of Christ, 
however, have rarely, if ever, offered a formal and systematic answer to this essential 
theological prolegomenon. While the Churches of Christ have not been bankrupt of 
epistemological assumptions, these assumptions are usually expressed only as informal 
intuitions rather than formal epistemological categories. 
 Epistemology has recently seen an impressive development of epistemological 
categories. Significant work has been done to distinguish competing theories of 
knowledge, and consequently, each of these theories has become increasingly thorough 
and sophisticated. Yet the Churches of Christ have seldom sought to utilize these 
developments. If, then, the informal epistemological intuitions and presumptions of the 
Churches of Christ were systematized and analyzed, where would they fit in light of
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1. This question was reinvigorated by Alvin Plantinga’s seminal work, God and Other Minds: A 
Study of the Rational Justification of Belief in God (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967), and ultimately 
culminated in his magnum opus, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
Other major contributors to this question include William P. Alston, Nicholas Wolterstorff, Eleonore 
Stump, Peter van Inwagen, Richard Swinburne, et al. 
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contemporary epistemology? And furthermore, would certain underlying epistemological 
issues rise to the surface upon formal analysis that have so far, by avoiding close 
scrutiny, remained obscure? It is these questions that are the focus of this thesis.  
 
1.2 Account of the Issue 
 Though not as much work has been done on epistemology in particular, scholarly 
attempts have been made to understand the general philosophical assumptions operating 
in the Churches of Christ. There are three ways one might go about this task of analyzing 
the philosophical underpinnings of the Churches of Christ. One method would be to 
investigate the philosophical foundations upon which the Stone-Campbell Movement (of 
which the Churches of Christ are a part) was originally built. Let’s call this the historical 
roots project. This project has seen a considerable amount of attention in the past several 
decades. In his book, The Philosophy of Religion of Alexander Campbell, J. Caleb 
Clanton seeks to identify the philosophical influences of Alexander Campbell and then 
goes on to demonstrate how those influences manifested themselves in particular 
theological desiderata.2 Along similar lines, Richard T. Hughes and C. Leonard Allen, in 
their book, Discovering Our Roots: The Ancestry of Churches of Christ,3 trace the 
philosophical and theological roots of the beginnings of the Stone-Campbell Movement 
from the various streams of thoughts from which it grew, such as the Renaissance, the 
Age of Reason, Martin Luther, and the Anabaptists. These works and others like them in 
the historical roots project seek to uncover the theological and philosophical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2. J Caleb Clanton, The Philosophy of Religion of Alexander Campbell (Knoxville: The University 
of Tennessee Press, 2013). Samuel Morris Eames undertook a similar project some years earlier in his book 
The Philosophy of Alexander Campbell (Bethany, WV: Bethany College, 1966). 
 
3. Crawford Leonard Allen, and Richard T. Hughes, Discovering Our Roots: The Ancestry of 
Churches of Christ (Abilene: ACU Press, 1988). 
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commitments of the Churches of Christ by understanding their origins in the Stone-
Campbell Movement. However, if one is hoping to understand Churches of Christ today, 
these sorts of projects will not be sufficient; there is a significant gap between historical 
figures or movements (such as Alexander Campbell or the Renaissance, as cited above) 
and any modern incarnation of the Churches of Christ.4 
 A second method of examining the philosophical assumptions of the Churches of 
Christ would be to track a certain idea(s) from the beginning of the Stone-Campbell 
Movement, recording its development all the way until the present. Let’s call this the 
historical development project. In short, the historical development project seeks to 
understand assumptions and beliefs in the Churches of Christ today in light of their 
developments throughout the history of the Stone-Campbell Movement. This project has 
seen a fair amount of attention, though not as much as the historical roots project. In 
Things Unseen: Churches of Christ In (and After) the Modern Era, C. Leonard Allen 
traces the hermeneutical principles of the Stone-Campbell Movement from John Locke 
and Francis Bacon, continuing through Alexander Campbell and Barton Stone, and on 
through to the modern and postmodern eras.5 In a similar vein, Jeff Childers, Doug 
Foster, and Jack Reese describe a changing culture in the Churches of Christ in their 
book, The Crux of the Matter: Crisis, Tradition, and the Future of the Churches of 
Christ.6 In the Crux of the Matter, the authors seek to show from where the Churches of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4.	  I	  want	  to	  emphasize	  that	  the	  historical	  roots	  project	  is	  immensely	  important.	  Not	  only	  does	  it	  provide	  understanding	  to	  the	  historical	  circumstances	  that	  have	  given	  rise	  to	  modern	  iterations	  of	  Stone-­‐Campbell	  movement	  churches,	  it	  may	  also	  alert	  one	  to	  tendencies	  and	  trends	  in	  the	  theology,	  philosophy,	  and	  behavior	  of	  these	  churches	  that	  may	  still	  be	  observable	  today,	  if	  only	  in	  updated	  variations.	  
 
5. Crawford Leonard Allen, Things Unseen: Churches of Christ in (And After) the Modern Age 
(Siloam Springs: Leafwood Publishers, 2004). 
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Christ have come and how they have developed in order to show where they might go in 
the future. The historical development project, therefore, seeks to provide an intellectual 
framework for understanding the issues of the Churches of Christ today by studying the 
issues of the past and the answers that have been provided to them. These works are also 
important for understanding the intellectual heritage of the Churches of Christ and can 
also go a long way in the body’s self-understanding.7  
The final method for examining the philosophical underpinnings of the Churches 
of Christ is to illuminate the current philosophical assumptions prevalent in the Churches 
of Christ in light of modern philosophy and theology. Let’s call this the philosophical 
theology project. Similar to the historical development project, the philosophical theology 
project seeks to understand the background philosophical assumptions and beliefs of the 
Churches of Christ, but instead of understanding those assumptions in light of the 
historical development of ideas, the philosophical theology project seeks to understand 
these assumptions by means of modern philosophical and theological categories in a 
formal and technical sense. Of the three projects I have listed, the philosophical theology 
project has by far received the least attention, particularly in the area of epistemology. 
Short essays have put Restoration principles in dialogue with modern epistemology, but 
substantive research in this area is sorely lacking.8 Therefore in order to take a step 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6. Jeff W. Childers, Douglas A. Foster, and Jack Roger Reese, Heart of the Restoration Series. 
The Crux of the Matter: Crisis, Tradition, and the Future of Churches of Christ, (Abilene: ACU Press, 
2002). 
 
7. For examples of other projects in the historical development project, see Patrick Leon Brooks, 
Lockean Epistemology and the Indwelling Spirit in the Restoration Movement (Master’s Thesis, Abilene 
Christian University), 1977; Thomas H. Olbricht, “Hermeneutics In The Churches of Christ.” Restoration 
Quarterly 37, no. 1 (1995): 1-24. 
 
8. For similar essays, see John D. Castelein, “Can The Restoration Movement Plea Survive If 
Belief In Objective Truth Is Abandoned,” The Stone-Campbell Journal 1, no. 2 (1988): 27-44; Mark E. 
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towards addressing this dearth of research and to achieve the goal of this thesis to 
elucidate a prominent epistemology in the Churches of Christ, this thesis offers an 
analysis and critique of the epistemology of Thomas B. Warren. 
 
1.3 Preliminary Remarks 
 Before proceeding, It will be helpful to do a certain amount of throat clearing. 
Namely, it is important to note that when I mention the “Churches of Christ,” I am 
referring in this thesis to a particular strand of the Churches of Christ. The Churches of 
Christ are not a monolithic group; not every church that identifies as a Church of Christ is 
identical to the others. As such, whenever I refer to or describe the Churches of Christ, I 
should be taken to mean those American churches of Christ characterized by a principled 
objection to instrumental music in worship, a view of scripture as infallible (i.e., without 
factual error or internal contradiction), an understanding of the Bible as the only 
legitimate theological resource (i.e., not creedal statements, traditions, etc.), and a 
commitment to the restoration and replication of the church as it existed in the first 
century CE. It to these churches that Thomas B. Warren devoted his time and effort and 
that therefore bear his epistemic resemblance.  
 
1. 4 Why Thomas B. Warren? 
I have chosen to focus on Thomas B. Warren for three reasons. First, Warren both 
represents and forms many of the background beliefs of a particular strand of 
contemporary Churches of Christ. He represents the epistemological beliefs of the 
Churches of Christ in that Warren’s epistemological convictions are paradigmatic of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Powell, “Canonical Theism and Theological Commitments in the Stone-Campbell Movement,” Restoration 
Quarterly 51, no. 4 (2009): 227-238. 
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those held by certain members of the Churches of Christ. But Warren also formed certain 
background beliefs of the Churches of Christ in that he formalized many of the inchoate 
epistemological views that were circulating in the Churches of Christ in a way that was 
accessible to the average member. He thus took important steps in developing a 
framework for understanding epistemological issues that had not before been expressed 
by members of the Churches of Christ. 
It is difficult to understate the impact Warren had on the Churches of Christ. 
Gregory Allen Tidwell, editor of The Gospel Advocate, went so far as to call Warren a 
“towering figure in the Lord’s church of the 20th century.”9 Indeed he was. Thomas B. 
Warren was editor of both The Spiritual Sword as well as Firm Foundation, two 
prominent periodicals that primarily circulate among Churches of Christ, for a combined 
thirty years. He was also a professor at Abilene Christian University for two years (1946-
1947), Chair of the Bible Department at Fort Worth Christian College and also University 
President for three years, Chair of the Department of Bible at Freed-Hardeman University 
for seven years (1964-1971), Professor of Philosophy of Religion and Christian 
Apologetics at Harding Graduate School of Religion for eight years (1971-1979), and 
Executive Vice President, Dean of the Graduate School, and Professor of Philosophy of 
Religion and Christian Apologetics at Tennessee Bible College for four years. 
Furthermore, Warren’s public speaking events were also widely attended. When he was 
in good health, Warren preached around twenty-five Gospel meetings a year,10 and he 
also had public debates with such prominent figures as Reading University Professor of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9.	  “Testimonials,”	  Warren	  Christian	  Apologetics	  Center,	  accessed	  May	  20,	  2016,	  https://warrenapologeticscenter.org/about-­‐us/testimonials.html	  	  10.	  Scott	  Harp,	  “Thomas	  Bratton	  Warren	  PhD,”	  History	  of	  the	  Restoration	  Movement,	  accessed	  May,	  20,	  2016,	  http://www.therestorationmovement.com/_states/texas/warren,_tb.htm	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Philosophy Antony Flew, Professor of Philosophy at the University of California at 
Berkeley Wallace Matson, and University of North Texas Professor of Philosophy Joe 
Barnhart.11 In fact, Flew recalls that his debate with Warren was the most well attended 
of any debate he had in his life, estimating that there were five to seven thousand people 
in attendance.12 Warren was and continues to be such a large figure in the Churches of 
Christ that there is now a Christian apologetics institute that bears his name.13 Warren’s 
numerous teaching positions at higher education institutions affiliated with the Churches 
of Christ, his considerable number of books and publications, and his wide audience of 
readers all combined to stretch Warren’s influence not just throughout North America but 
throughout the world.  
The second reason I have chosen to focus on Warren is because he is a 
contemporary figure. Because the philosophical theology project seeks to address 
epistemological issues in the Churches of Christ as they exist today, it is necessary in this 
thesis to identify a contemporary account of epistemological issues. Thomas B. Warren is 
just such a figure. Warren’s academic career was at its height in the ‘70s and ‘80s, and 
continued even until his death in 2000. His works are still widely circulated, and the 
Warren Christian Apologetics Center, which is dedicated to continuing Warren’s legacy, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11.	  David	  Lipe	  recalls	  that	  Warren	  had	  at	  least	  18	  public	  debates	  in	  his	  lecture	  “2008	  Lecture	  on	  the	  Debates	  of	  Thomas	  B.	  Warren”	  (presentation,	  2008	  Freed-­‐Hardeman	  Lectureship:	  Behold	  the	  
Lamb—John’s	  Gospel	  of	  Belief,	  Henderson	  TN,	  February	  3-­‐8	  2008).	  	  12.	  Antony	  Flew,	  There	  Is	  a	  God:	  How	  the	  World's	  Most	  Notorious	  Atheist	  Changed	  His	  Mind	  (New	  York:	  HarperOne,	  2007).	  These	  numbers	  are	  even	  more	  impressive	  considering	  the	  notoriety	  of	  others	  Flew	  also	  had	  discussions	  with	  such	  as	  C.S.	  Lewis,	  Alvin	  Plantinga,	  William	  Lane	  Craig,	  and	  Richard	  Swinburne.	  Charles	  Pugh	  estimates	  the	  crowd	  at	  the	  Warren-­‐Flew	  debate	  could	  have	  been	  as	  great	  as	  9,000	  in	  “The	  Vision	  of	  Thomas	  B.	  Warren”	  Warren	  Christian	  Apologetics	  Center,	  accessed	  May	  20,	  2016,	  https://warrenapologeticscenter.org/resources/articles/miscellanea/the-­‐vision-­‐of-­‐thomas-­‐b-­‐warren.html	  	  13.	  More	  information	  about	  the	  Warren	  Christian	  Apologetics	  Center	  can	  be	  found	  at	  it	  the	  following	  website:	  https://warrenapologeticscenter.org	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continues to spread Warren’s influence as far as possible. Because of his recent 
contributions, therefore, Warren is relevant for understanding the Churches of Christ 
today. 
Third and finally, there have been few in the Churches of Christ more qualified, 
intelligent, and articulate as Thomas B. Warren in the area of philosophy. Warren was a 
trained philosopher having received his Ph.D. from Vanderbilt University in the area of 
Philosophy of Religion. He is also widely lauded as one of the most important thinkers in 
the Churches of Christ in decades. Charles Pugh, co-founder and writer for the Warren 
Christian Apologetics Center, describes Warren as “one of the greatest apologists of all 
time.”14 According to Pugh, Warren “possessed the rare combination of gifted logical 
thinking, speaking, and writing done in the spirit of a true Christian Gentleman.”15 Pugh 
is not alone in this opinion. David Lipe, retired Professor of Philosophy at Freed-
Hardeman University, considers Warren among the truly great teachers and preachers to 
have ever lived.16 Even individuals not affiliated with the Churches of Christ hold Warren 
in high regard. William Sahakian, Chairman of Suffolk University’s philosophy 
department, considered Warren’s work “as fine an apologetic for traditional Christianity 
as any I have read.”17 Warren used his gifts of intellectual acumen and philosophical 
training to elucidate and defend Restoration principles. This, combined with his intense 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14.	  Charles	  Pugh	  III,	  “Warren	  Center:	  a	  Legacy,”	  Sufficient	  Evidence:	  A	  Journal	  of	  Christian	  
Apologetics	  1,	  no.1	  (2011):	  47.	  	  15.	  Ibid.	  Elsewhere,	  Pugh	  wrote,	  “Thomas	  B.	  Warren	  was	  one	  of	  the	  great	  gospel	  preachers	  of	  the	  20th	  century.	  Few	  matched	  him	  in	  ability	  and	  influence.	  As	  a	  thinker,	  writer,	  debater,	  teacher,	  scholar,	  and	  preacher,	  he	  had	  few	  equals.”	  in	  “Tribute	  to	  Brother	  Warren—Friend	  of	  God,”	  Therefore	  
Stand	  16,	  (2000):	  76.	  	  16.	  David	  Lipe,	  “2008	  Lecture	  on	  the	  Debates	  of	  Thomas	  B.	  Warren,”	  Lecture,	  accessed	  May	  20,	  2016,	  http://www.therestorationmovement.com/audio/Warren%20Debates.mp3	  	  17.	  Cited	  in	  Gospel	  Advocate	  64,	  no.	  47	  (November	  1972).	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commitment to the Church, resulted in a robust philosophy that undergirded Warren’s 
vision of Christianity. By examining Warren’s particular epistemology, we see an 
epistemology in the Churches of Christ in its most polished form.18 
 
1.5 Thesis Outline 
In order to achieve the goal of this thesis to describe and critique a prevalent 
epistemology in the Churches of Christ, this thesis proceeds as follows. It begins in the 
second chapter by unpacking the epistemology of Thomas B. Warren, whose particular 
work on epistemology functions to represent the epistemology of the Churches of Christ. 
I will primarily be interested in Warren’s account of knowledge; that is, Warren’s 
account of what criteria must be satisfied in order for a belief to count as knowledge. 
Warren does not offer a formal and systematic epistemology himself, so this thesis first 
systematizes Warren’s epistemology and also offers an analysis of his epistemological 
framework in light of contemporary epistemology. This is done by mining Warren’s 
writings for insight as to what he sees as the criteria of knowledge. However, this is not a 
purely descriptive task; it is also constructive. In one sense, Warren is very clear about 
his epistemological views; he takes great pains to articulate his arguments in a precise 
and organized fashion. But in another sense, his epistemology is somewhat opaque. 
Warren rarely uses words such as “knowledge” or “justification,” preferring instead to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   18.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  Warren’s	  is	  the	  best	  or	  most	  satisfying	  epistemology	  in	  the	  Churches	  of	  Christ—indeed,	  I	  argue	  in	  this	  thesis	  that	  his	  epistemology	  is	  deeply	  flawed—rather,	  for	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis	  of	  examining	  a	  thoroughly	  expressed	  epistemology	  in	  the	  Churches	  of	  Christ,	  Warren	  provides	  the	  most	  useful	  example	  due	  to	  his	  willingness	  to	  fully	  explicate	  his	  epistemological	  positions	  by	  way	  of	  his	  philosophical	  expertise.	  Furthermore,	  it	  may	  not	  be	  that	  Warren	  is	  the	  most	  representative	  of	  the	  Churches	  of	  Christ	  in	  regards	  to	  epistemology,	  but	  he	  is	  at	  least	  adequately	  representative	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  thesis.	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discourse about what one ought to believe or how one should behave intellectually.19 
While these sorts of normative claims are no doubt important, they do little to address 
which beliefs objectively count as knowledge. In the few cases that Warren does talk 
about knowledge, it is often about what one does not know, rather than what does in fact 
count as knowledge.20 Instead, most of Warren’s epistemological claims concern what is 
or is not rational. He certainly never straightforwardly delineates what he sees as the 
necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge in any formal and systematic way.  
These difficulties don’t just obscure Warren’s background epistemological 
framework in a way that requires a more careful and thorough reading of his written 
work—it also calls for a constructive element. Due to the situational nature of his 
writings, certain aspects of Warren’s epistemological framework never get 
straightforwardly addressed, leaving anyone interested in illuminating Warren’s meta-
epistemology to fill in the gaps as closely as possible in a way that coheres with his 
explicit epistemological statements. Of course this constructive element is not just 
guesswork, but it is also not simply an orderly arrangement of his ideas. It is conjectural 
by nature. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19.	  Numerous	  statements	  throughout	  Warren’s	  Logic	  and	  the	  Bible	  demonstrate	  this	  point:	  “Every	  person	  should	  strive	  to	  give	  good	  reasons	  for	  his	  conclusions,”	  14;	  “All	  men	  should	  recognize	  the	  truth	  of	  and	  honor	  the	  law	  of	  rationality	  (men	  should	  draw	  only	  such	  conclusions	  as	  are	  warranted	  by	  the	  evidence).	  Further,	  as	  has	  been	  pointed	  out	  in	  this	  present	  chapter,	  all	  men	  should	  recognize	  the	  truthfulness	  of	  and	  honor	  the	  ‘laws	  of	  thought.’”	  25-­‐26;	  “Men	  should	  draw	  only	  such	  conclusions	  as	  are	  a	  part	  of	  arguments	  which	  are	  valid	  and	  have	  true	  premises.”	  79;	  “We	  ought	  to	  justify	  our	  conclusions	  by	  adequate	  evidence.”	  14;	  “Men	  should	  use	  their	  power	  to	  think	  validly	  to	  	  ‘prove	  all	  things’	  and	  to	  ‘hold	  fast’	  to	  what	  is	  true.”	  42.	  	  20.	  For	  example,	  Warren	  devotes	  an	  entire	  chapter	  of	  Logic	  and	  the	  Bible	  to	  attacking	  various	  iterations	  of	  the	  atheists’	  claim	  “I	  know	  that	  God	  does	  not	  exist.”	  In	  it,	  Warren	  repeatedly	  charges	  that	  unless	  atheists	  can	  provide	  a	  valid	  argument	  that	  proves	  their	  claim,	  they	  do	  not	  have	  knowledge	  of	  the	  claim	  they	  are	  making.	  See	  Logic	  and	  the	  Bible,	  109-­‐124.	  
	  	   	   	   	  
11	  
Once a complete picture of Warren’s epistemology is laid out, I then offer a 
critique in the third chapter. This involves an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses 
of Warren’s epistemology. It will be the claim of this chapter that there are decided 
weaknesses in Warren’s epistemology. These weaknesses are fatal to the point that 
Warren’s epistemology, if taken to its logical end, results in skepticism in general and 
agnosticism in particular. This is no doubt a bold claim, so to make good on my 
argument, this chapter identifies and delineates three separate problems with Warren’s 
epistemology all of which lead to skepticism. But there are also certain strengths of 
Warren’s epistemology. As such, I will also highlight the considerable strengths of 
Warren’s epistemology, especially as it relates to knowledge of God. 
This thesis concludes in the fourth chapter by offering a way forward in religious 
epistemology. Such an account must avoid the pitfalls of Warren’s epistemology but 
should also seek to utilize its strengths. Religious epistemology has seen a surge of 
interest over the last half decade, so I highlight in this chapter recent developments in 
epistemology that may provide valuable insights as to how one ought to think about 
knowledge of God. While it is not within the purview of this thesis to offer a complete 
account of knowledge of God, I do at least hope to pave the way for this important task to 
be done by providing what I see as some helpful starting points.  
 
1.6 Contribution 
This thesis contributes to current scholarly discussion in two ways. First, it takes a 
step toward bridging the gap in research concerning a formal description of the 
epistemology of Churches of Christ as it exists today. Given the emphasis in the 
Churches of Christ on hermeneutics, apologetics, and knowledge of absolute truth, there 
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is a distinct culture of attention to epistemological concerns. Yet despite this tradition of 
epistemological reflection in the Churches of Christ, unfortunately little work has been 
done to describe or unpack this epistemology in any formal way. Consequently, this 
thesis aims to aid in providing an understanding of an epistemology prevalent in the 
Churches of Christ today. 
Second, despite his considerable influence on the Churches of Christ, no critical 
study has been done to analyze the work of Thomas B. Warren. Research is lacking that 
explores Warren’s particular philosophical worldviews, in what ways Warren has 
affected the Churches of Christ, in what ways his ideas still exist in the Churches of 
Christ, or in what ways his ideas have been disseminated even among those members 
who may not be directly familiar with Warren or his writings. In light of this dearth of 
research, this thesis seeks to offer a deeper understanding of Thomas B. Warren and his 
work.
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CHAPTER II 
  
THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF THOMAS B. WARREN: AN ANALYSIS 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I aim to provide a framework for understanding the epistemology 
of Thomas B. Warren. Although Warren wrote and spoke extensively about 
epistemology, nowhere does he clearly and systematically lay out what he sees as the 
criteria for knowledge. Rather, Warren tends to address epistemology only as it relates to 
specific questions that crop up either in society or in his churches. For instance his book, 
When Is An Example Binding?, is replete with epistemological claims but only as they 
relate to adjudicating whether examples in the Bible are instructive for contemporary 
churches with regard to doctrine. This sort of situational epistemology might be helpful 
for his readers who have rather practical concerns about how to interpret and apply the 
Bible in a modern context, but it leaves open the question of what theoretical framework 
animates Warren’s answers to such specific epistemological issues.  
In order to provide this descriptive analysis of Warren’s epistemology, this 
chapter is organized into three sections, each dedicated to explicating a defining aspect of 
Warren’s epistemology. The first section defines two theories—internalism and 
externalism—regarding the fundamental nature of epistemic justification and then 
identifies Warren’s epistemology as exemplifying one of these theories. The second
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explores Warren’s understanding of how a person’s beliefs must relate to each 
other in order to count as knowledge. Specifically, I briefly delineate three standard ways 
epistemologists have thought about the structure of belief: foundationalism, infinitism, 
and coherentism. I then relate Warren’s epistemology to one of these three theories, 
namely foundationalism. Finally, the third section synthesizes the components of 
Warren’s epistemology described in the previous sections along with other relevant 
aspects of Warren’s epistemology in order to offer a unified account of his epistemology. 
The chapter concludes by employing this explanation of Warren’s general epistemology 
toward the end of understanding his religious epistemology. 
 
2.2 Warren: Internalist or Externalist? 
In this section, I aim to shed light on Thomas B. Warren’s conception of the 
fundamental nature of epistemic justification. By justification, I mean that property which 
differentiates mere true belief from knowledge. A belief could be true but not count as 
knowledge. Suppose I have a friend who has a bag of marbles in his backpack and he 
tells me that if I can tell him how many marbles are in it, he will give them to me. If in a 
stroke of good luck I guess there are 37 marbles and it just so happens that my guess is 
exactly right, did I know there were 37 marbles in his bag? No, despite the fact that I 
formed a true belief, it does not count as knowledge. The difference is that I was not 
justified in believing there were 37 marbles in his bag. In other words, to say that a belief 
is justified is to say that the belief is acceptable, proper, or up to standard. But what is it 
that makes a belief justified? The answer to this question is the subject of no little debate, 
and though there about as many answers to this question as there are epistemologists, it is 
commonly agreed that these answers fall under one of two general theories: internalism 
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or externalism. In this section, I define these two epistemic theories and identify 
Warren’s epistemology as either internalist or externalist. 
Let us first consider internalism about knowledge. According to internalists, the 
factors that justify a true belief in a way that counts as knowledge are solely internal to 
the knower. A minimal definition of internalism (MDI) could be stated as follows:  
(MDI) Subject S is justified for Proposition P at time t iff S is able to explain upon 
reflection at t how S knows P to be true.  
 
In other words, S must have cognitive access to the grounds of S’s knowledge.21  
 
Suppose I believe that my eyes are green. I am internalist-justified in believing my eyes 
are green only if I have access upon reflection to the reasons I believe my eyes are green 
(e.g., I have seen in a mirror my eyes are green, a trustworthy person told me they are 
green, etc.). If I believe that I have green eyes but I am not aware of the reasons I believe 
I have green eyes, I am not justified, even if I happen to be correct. A view counts as a 
version of internalism only if it endorses this awareness requirement. 
 Externalism, on the other hand, is perhaps best understood in contrast to 
internalism: the factors that justify a true belief in a way that counts as knowledge are not 
solely internal to the knower. Instead, externalist accounts of knowledge emphasize the 
importance of factors outside the control of the knower such as properly functioning 
faculties, a truth-conducive environment, and/or whether the belief is caused by the state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21.	  This	  is	  a	  strong	  version	  of	  internalism.	  There	  are	  weaker	  versions	  of	  internalism,	  but	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  time	  and	  space,	  and	  because	  Warren	  is	  not	  a	  weak	  internalist,	  I	  will	  not	  use	  the	  space	  in	  this	  chapter	  for	  drawing	  out	  such	  a	  distinction.	  In	  short,	  awareness	  internalism,	  a	  strong	  version	  of	  internalism,	  requires	  that	  the	  subject	  have	  access	  to	  the	  grounds	  of	  her	  knowledge	  at	  the	  time	  of	  belief.	  Mentalism	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  which	  is	  a	  weak	  version	  of	  internalism,	  maintains	  that	  one	  must	  merely	  be	  able	  to	  access	  the	  reasons	  for	  beliefs,	  but	  does	  not	  require	  that	  one	  be	  able	  to	  do	  so	  at	  the	  time	  of	  belief	  in	  order	  for	  the	  belief	  to	  be	  justified.	  This	  is	  a	  distinction	  made	  by	  Michael	  Bergmann	  in	  
Justification	  Without	  Awareness	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  2006),	  45-­‐75.	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of affairs that makes it true.22 Furthermore, unlike internalists, externalists about 
knowledge reject that a person must have cognitive access to the grounds of her 
knowledge. For example, suppose that in my contribution to a discussion about the Civil 
War, I throw out a factoid, but when asked how I know such an obscure thing, I cannot 
remember where I heard it. For the externalist, my belief may still count as knowledge as 
long as the belief was formed by reliable processes, even if I do not remember on what 
basis the belief was originally formed. Furthermore, I never had to know why I believed 
it in the first place. As long as my belief was formed by the operation of properly 
functioning faculties (or some other externalist criteria), it does not matter if I am aware 
of the reasons for my belief—I know it anyway. This is the fundamental difference 
between externalism and internalism.23 
Given these definitions of internalism and externalism, Thomas B. Warren’s 
epistemology should be thought of as an internalist one. For Warren, certain truths can be 
known and the gaining of that knowledge “necessarily involves the reasoning of men.”24 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22.	  For	  more	  extensive	  discussion	  of	  the	  differences	  of	  externalism	  and	  internalism,	  see	  Hilary	  Kornblith	  ed.	  Epistemology:	  Internalism	  and	  Externalism	  (Malden,	  Massachusetts:	  Blackwell	  Publishers,	  2001);	  Matthias	  Steup	  ed.	  Contemporary	  Debates	  in	  Epistemology	  (Chichester,	  UK:	  Wiley-­‐Blackwell,	  2013),	  324-­‐350.	  	  23.	  It	  is	  perhaps	  counter-­‐intuitive	  to	  refer	  to	  this	  as	  “externalism.”	  After	  all,	  so-­‐called	  externalist	  criteria	  such	  as	  properly	  functioning	  faculties	  are	  nonetheless	  “inside”	  the	  mind	  of	  the	  knower,	  and,	  for	  that	  matter,	  so	  are	  all	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  beliefs	  that	  the	  knower	  might	  hold.	  For	  this	  reason,	  “internalism”	  and	  “externalism”	  should	  not	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  geographical	  descriptors	  for	  the	  location	  relative	  to	  the	  knower	  of	  the	  factors	  that	  justify	  belief.	  Rather,	  they	  should	  be	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  volitional	  control.	  Whether	  or	  not	  my	  faculties	  function	  properly	  or	  my	  environment	  is	  truth-­‐conducive	  is	  outside	  of	  my	  control,	  so	  therefore	  they	  are	  “external”	  justifiers,	  whereas	  whether	  or	  not	  I	  do	  my	  due	  diligence	  to	  only	  believe	  those	  things	  for	  which	  I	  have	  access	  to	  good	  reasons	  is	  within	  my	  control,	  and	  are	  therefore	  “internal”	  justifiers.	  For	  more	  on	  the	  meaning	  of	  “internalism”	  in	  contrast	  to	  “externalism,”	  see	  Ted	  Poston,	  “Internalism	  and	  Externalism	  in	  Epistemology,”	  Internet	  
Encyclopedia	  of	  Philosophy,	  accessed	  May	  20,	  2016,	  http://www.iep.utm.edu/int-­‐ext/	  	  24.	  Thomas	  B.	  Warren,	  When	  Is	  An	  Example	  Binding?	  (Jonesboro:	  National	  Christian	  Press,	  1975),	  6.	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In Logic and the Bible, which is the most explicitly epistemological of his books, Warren 
sets out an account of logic and its relationship to the Bible. In it, he dedicates a chapter 
to refuting naturalism and evolution. He concludes this chapter by challenging the 
naturalist claim that they know naturalism to be true, and in so doing reveals his 
internalist position about knowledge. He writes, “If you have not formulated a sound 
argument which proves that [naturalism is true], then you do not know (as you claim to) 
that all human beings now living on earth owe their ultimate origin to evolution (by 
purely naturalistic forces) from non-living matter.”25 He also writes that if a person 
claims to know that the Bible is the word of God, “he comes under the obligation to 
explain how he came to know that at least one human being knows that the Bible is the 
word of God.”26 For Warren, in order for a belief to be justified, a person must have 
internal access to a sound argument that proves the belief that they hold. If this condition 
is not met, even if the belief is true, it does not count as knowledge. As Warren so starkly 
puts it, a person who “contends that a given position is true without knowing that such is 
the case is, in fact, guilty of falsehood and, even if the position is true, then he is still not 
excused or justified in asserting that to be true which he did not know to be true.”27  
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25.	  Thomas	  B.	  Warren,	  Logic	  and	  the	  Bible	  (Jonesboro:	  National	  Christian	  Press,	  1982),	  114.	  	   26.	  Ibid.,	  111,	  emphasis	  original.	  	  27.	  Ibid.,	  73	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2.2.1 Warren as a Deontological Internalist 
It is clear that Warren is an internalist, but can we parse Warren’s internalism 
further? 28 After all, the definition of internalism given above is only a minimal one. 
There are almost always additional components to any full-blown internalist theory of 
knowledge. Indeed, not just any reason for a belief can count as justification. I am not 
justified in believing my wife is having dinner with her friend Noemí just because she is 
out of the house. She could be doing any number of things—buying groceries, working in 
the library, or going on a run. Even if my belief happened to be true, I would need 
additional or better reasons in order to know (i.e. be justified in believing) that she is 
indeed getting dinner with Noemí. So despite the fact that I have internal access to the 
reason for my belief that my wife is at dinner with Noemí, there is still something 
missing about my belief that is necessary for it to be justified in a way that counts as 
knowledge. So where have I gone wrong?  
One way of answering this question is what we will call deontological 
internalism. Deontological internalism fundamentally involves fulfilling one’s epistemic 
duties or obligations. More technically, a person is justified on deontological internalism 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28.	  I	  have	  found	  nothing	  in	  any	  of	  Warren’s	  writing	  that	  indicates	  he	  is	  anything	  but	  an	  internalist,	  except	  for	  the	  following:	  ““Surely	  everyone	  can	  see	  by	  this	  time	  that	  while	  there	  are	  many	  things	  we	  can	  know.	  For	  instance,	  I	  know	  that	  I	  have	  three	  children.	  I	  do	  not	  have	  to	  set	  out	  a	  syllogism	  in	  order	  to	  know	  that	  I	  have	  three	  children.	  But	  there	  are	  many	  things	  that	  I	  do	  have	  to	  set	  out	  in	  a	  syllogism.	  I	  have	  to	  reason	  about	  it	  correctly	  or	  we	  simply	  could	  not	  know	  it”	  The	  Warren-­‐
Flew	  Debate	  on	  the	  Existence	  of	  God:	  A	  Four-­‐Night	  Debate	  Held	  in	  the	  Coliseum	  on	  the	  Campus	  of	  North	  
Texas	  University,	  September	  20-­‐23,	  1976	  (Jonesboro:	  National	  Christian	  Press,	  1977),	  246,	  emphasis	  original.	  Here	  Warren	  seems	  to	  hint	  that	  there	  are	  perhaps	  certain	  contexts	  where	  internal	  access	  to	  good	  reasons	  is	  not	  necessary	  for	  knowledge.	  However,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  whether	  Warren	  thinks	  some	  other	  internalist	  requirement	  is	  necessary	  for	  certain	  beliefs	  (such	  as	  the	  belief	  that	  he	  has	  three	  children)	  to	  count	  as	  knowledge,	  or	  whether	  one	  might	  know	  this	  in	  an	  externalist	  way.	  My	  inclination	  is	  towards	  the	  former	  rather	  than	  the	  latter,	  but	  Warren	  never	  again	  addresses	  the	  issue,	  so	  other	  possibilities	  remain	  open	  (I	  will	  explain	  what	  I	  consider	  the	  other	  internalist	  requirement	  later	  in	  this	  chapter).	  Regardless,	  it	  seems	  these	  instances	  are	  exceptional	  rather	  than	  typical	  in	  Warren’s	  mind.	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if and when she regulates her beliefs in such a way as to conform to the doxastic duty not 
to affirm a proposition unless she perceives it with sufficient clarity and distinctness.29 To 
fulfill this objective, epistemic duty is to have done one’s due diligence, only to behave 
as is intellectually permissible, and to be in no way blameworthy for any epistemic 
wrongdoing.30 Suppose again that my wife is out of the house and I form the belief that 
she is getting dinner with Noemí. This belief is justified for me in a deontological way if I 
have done my duty to find out the truth of it. Perhaps I have inquired to the right people 
(maybe even my wife) as to my wife’s whereabouts or possibly I happened to see for 
myself that my wife and Noemí are at dinner together. There are a number of ways I 
could fulfill my epistemic duty, but no matter which way I choose, I must have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29.	  This	  is	  the	  definition	  given	  by	  Alvin	  Plantinga,	  in	  Warrant:	  The	  Current	  Debate	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1993),	  13.	  Or	  as	  Roderick	  Chisholm	  puts	  it,	  “We	  may	  assume	  that	  every	  person	  is	  subject	  to	  a	  purely	  intellectual	  requirement:	  that	  of	  trying	  his	  best	  to	  bring	  it	  about	  that,	  for	  every	  proposition	  that	  he	  considers,	  he	  accepts	  it	  if	  and	  only	  if	  it	  is	  true”	  in	  Theory	  of	  
Knowledge	  (Englewood	  Cliffs:	  Prentice-­‐Hall,	  1977),	  14.	  	  30.	  One	  might	  also	  call	  this	  conception	  of	  justification	  “classical	  justification.”	  As	  Plantinga	  again	  puts	  it,	  “Indeed	  the	  whole	  notion	  of	  epistemic	  justification	  has	  its	  origin	  and	  home	  in	  this	  deontological	  territory	  of	  duty	  and	  permission,	  and	  it	  is	  only	  by	  way	  of	  analogical	  extension	  that	  the	  term	  ‘epistemic	  justification’	  is	  applied	  in	  other	  ways.	  Originally	  and	  at	  bottom,	  epistemic	  justification	  is	  deontological	  justification:	  deontological	  justification	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  regulation	  of	  belief.”	  Warrant:	  The	  Current	  Debate,	  14.	  This	  notion	  of	  justification	  stretches	  back	  through	  Locke	  and	  even	  to	  Descartes.	  In	  An	  Essay	  Concerning	  Human	  Understanding,	  A.C.	  Fraser	  (New	  York:	  Dover,	  1959),	  IV,	  xvii,	  24,	  pp.	  413-­‐14,	  John	  Locke’s	  describes	  justification:	  	  Faith	  is	  nothing	  but	  a	  firm	  assent	  of	  the	  mind:	  which	  if	  it	  be	  regulated,	  as	  is	  our	  duty,	  cannot	  be	  afforded	  to	  anything,	  but	  upon	  good	  reason;	  and	  so	  cannot	  be	  opposite	  to	  it.	  He	  that	  believes,	  without	  having	  any	  reason	  for	  believing,	  may	  be	  in	  love	  with	  his	  own	  fancies;	  but	  neither	  seeks	  truth	  as	  he	  ought,	  nor	  pays	  the	  obedience	  due	  his	  maker,	  who	  would	  have	  him	  use	  those	  discerning	  faculties	  he	  has	  given	  him,	  to	  keep	  him	  out	  of	  mistake	  and	  error.	  He	  that	  does	  not	  this	  to	  the	  best	  of	  his	  power,	  however	  he	  sometimes	  lights	  on	  truth,	  is	  in	  the	  right	  but	  by	  chance;	  and	  I	  know	  not	  whether	  the	  luckiness	  of	  this	  accident	  will	  excuse	  the	  irregularity	  of	  his	  proceeding.	  This	  at	  lest	  is	  certain,	  that	  he	  must	  be	  accountable	  for	  whatever	  mistakes	  he	  runs	  into:	  whereas	  he	  that	  makes	  use	  of	  the	  light	  and	  faculties	  God	  has	  given	  him,	  and	  seeks	  sincerely	  to	  discover	  truth,	  by	  those	  helps	  and	  abilities	  he	  has,	  may	  have	  this	  satisfaction	  in	  doing	  his	  duty	  as	  a	  rational	  creature,	  that	  though	  he	  should	  miss	  the	  truth,	  he	  will	  not	  miss	  the	  reward	  of	  it.	  For	  he	  governs	  his	  assent	  right,	  and	  places	  it	  as	  he	  should,	  who	  in	  any	  case	  or	  matter	  whatsoever,	  believes	  or	  disbelieves,	  according	  as	  reason	  directs	  him.	  He	  that	  does	  otherwise,	  transgresses	  against	  his	  own	  light,	  and	  misuses	  those	  faculties,	  which	  were	  given	  him.	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intentionally set out to justify my belief in such a way as to be virtually certain of the 
truth of it; my belief is not nor can it be the product of mere luck or accident.  
Thomas B. Warren’s epistemology is best understood as exemplifying 
deontological internalism. Warren certainly sees duty as fundamental to epistemology. 
This deontological epistemology is expressed implicitly in his frequent use of “ought” 
language about belief; Warren’s writings are rife with claims about how one “must,” 
“should,” or “ought to” behave intellectually.31 But Warren’s deontological epistemology 
is also expressed explicitly. He repeatedly refers to the obligation of human persons to 
“recognize and honor the law of rationality.”32 For Warren, to make a claim that one 
knows a proposition is to “put oneself under the obligation to demonstrate that 
proposition (that is, prove it to be true),”33 and especially concerning religious claims, 
“one is under the solemn obligation to put the doctrine to the appropriate test.”34 
Therefore, if a person has not fulfilled this objective epistemic obligation to explain how 
he came to know whatever proposition he believes, he does not have knowledge. More 
formally, justification, for Warren, is that state in which one forms and holds his beliefs 
in accord with his epistemic duty to honor the law of rationality. 
 This epistemic duty to honor the law of rationality is an obligation to God to do 
one’s due diligence with regard to intellectual matters. For Warren, just as morality is 
objectively grounded in God’s will, so also is epistemology.35 Though perhaps some 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31.	  See	  footnote	  18.	  	  32.	  This	  specific	  phrase	  is	  so	  central	  to	  Warren’s	  epistemology	  that	  he	  repeats	  it	  over	  fifteen	  times	  in	  Logic	  and	  the	  Bible	  alone.	  	  	  33.	  Warren,	  Logic	  and	  the	  Bible,	  71.	  	  34.	  Ibid.,	  87.	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people may be inclined to form beliefs on the basis of no or little evidence, this manner of 
action is “not pleasing to God,” and instead, God requires that claims be “put to the 
test.”36 Indeed, it is God’s will that the human mind be used rationally.37 Both the Bible 
and humans’ natural predispositions indicate, Warren argues, that one must honor the law 
of rationality; no one can do otherwise and be pleasing to God.38 While this obligation is 
especially binding as it relates to religious beliefs, this objective duty to form beliefs only 
on the basis of adequate evidence also holds in “ordinary life.”39 This obligation exists 
because God has created humans with “intelligent minds,” able to recognize, to observe, 
and to properly consider the evidential basis for those beliefs which he holds.40  
And how does one fulfill her epistemic duty to honor the law of rationality? She 
does it by drawing only such conclusions as are warranted by the evidence.41 This 
fundamentally involves appropriately gathering and considering the relevant evidence for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35.	  Regarding	  grounding	  ethics	  in	  the	  existence	  of	  God,	  Warren	  writes,	  “if	  the	  theistic	  view	  is	  true,	  then	  our	  creator	  is	  God,	  there	  is	  real	  objective	  right	  and	  wrong,	  there	  is	  real	  objective	  moral	  good	  and	  evil.	  If	  God	  is,	  if	  the	  theistic	  view	  is	  true,	  then	  we	  do	  have	  a	  real	  obligation	  to	  recognize	  it,	  to	  recognize	  the	  evidence	  for	  God	  and	  to	  obey	  God.”	  Warren-­‐Flew	  Debate,	  10.	  Note	  the	  hint	  of	  epistemology	  there.	  If	  God	  is	  real,	  we	  have	  an	  obligation	  to	  recognize	  the	  evidence	  for	  God.	  Warren’s	  ethics	  are	  connected	  to	  his	  epistemology.	  	  36.	  Warren,	  Logic	  and	  the	  Bible,	  90.	  Elsewhere,	  Warren	  states	  that	  every	  person	  “shoulders	  the	  burden	  of	  proof”	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  beliefs	  that	  they	  hold,	  in	  “Christians	  Must	  Oppose	  and	  Reject	  Agnosticism”	  in	  Spiritual	  Sword	  8	  (July	  1977):	  1.	  	  37.	  Warren	  writes,	  “God	  intends	  the	  human	  mind	  to	  be	  used	  rationally,	  with	  each	  person	  recognizing	  that	  he	  should	  only	  draw	  such	  conclusions	  as	  are	  warranted	  by	  the	  evidence.”	  Jesus—the	  
Lamb	  Who	  is	  a	  Lion	  (Jonesboro:	  National	  Christian	  Press):	  210.	  	  38.	  Warren,	  Logic	  and	  the	  Bible,	  86.	  	   39.	  “Even	  in	  ordinary	  life,	  one	  should	  draw	  only	  such	  conclusions	  as	  are	  warranted	  by	  the	  evidence.	  And	  God	  demands—by	  making	  such	  clear	  in	  the	  Bible—that	  men	  should	  draw	  only	  such	  conclusions	  (as	  to	  what	  the	  Bible	  teaches)	  as	  are	  warranted	  by	  the	  explicit	  evidence	  of	  the	  Bible,”	  Warren,	  When	  Is	  an	  Example	  Binding?	  30.	  	  40.	  Warren,	  When	  Is	  an	  Example	  Binding?	  31.	  As	  Warren	  describes	  it	  elsewhere,	  “There	  is	  not	  one	  thing	  which	  God	  expects	  men	  to	  hold	  as	  a	  constituent	  element	  of	  their	  faith	  except	  that	  for	  which	  He	  (God)	  has	  provided	  adequate	  evidence,”	  Logic	  and	  the	  Bible,	  41.	  	   41.	  Warren,	  Logic	  and	  the	  Bible,	  4.	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any belief that one might hold. To say that there is adequate evidence for a given belief is 
to say that the evidence is relevant to and also sufficient for the conclusion to which it is 
directed.42 Furthermore, the conclusions that I draw must never “outrun or be out of 
harmony with the evidence which is relevant to the truth of the question which I am 
considering at any given time.”43 Until one has considered the relevant evidence properly, 
he only has mere opinion, not knowledge.44 It is only when a person has fulfilled his 
objective, epistemic duty to appropriately gather and consider the relevant evidence in 
such a way as to entail the truth of the proposition in question that he can justify his belief 
in a way that counts as knowledge. 
 
2.3 Warren on the Structure of Belief 
We have so far explored Thomas B. Warren’s conception of the fundamental 
nature of justification, but that is only one aspect to consider in the pursuit of 
understanding Warren’s epistemological framework. In this section, I examine how 
Warren thinks about the structure of belief or how beliefs ought to relate together. Almost 
every belief that a person has relies on or is related to other beliefs that she has.  I may 
believe that my dog is hungry, but this one belief involves all sorts of other beliefs. I must 
have beliefs about what it means to be a dog, I must believe that I own a dog, and I must 
have beliefs about what would indicate that my dog is hungry, among other such beliefs. 
So the question arises: if I were to know that my dog is hungry, how must all of these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   42.	  Ibid.,	  14	  	  43.	  Ibid.,	  4.	  	   44.	  Ibid.,	  121.	  “[A	  belief]	  will	  be	  nothing	  more	  than	  a	  matter	  of	  mere	  speculation	  (a	  mere	  ‘leap	  into	  the	  dark’),	  a	  matter	  of	  mere	  opinion	  only	  until	  one	  comes	  to	  know	  what	  the	  relevant	  evidence	  is	  and	  then	  reasons	  about	  that	  evidence	  correctly.”	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beliefs relate together? What is the nature of these relationships, and how do they 
function epistemically speaking? Answers to these questions are essential to any 
epistemic theory. In this section, therefore, I briefly define three standard theories 
regarding the architecture of knowledge and then situate Warren’s epistemology under 
one of these theories.  
Before defining any theories, it is first important to make a distinction between 
two kinds of beliefs. Suppose I look outside my window and see the trees in my backyard 
swaying, each leaf showing one side one moment and the other the next. Because I am 
familiar with this view, suppose I infer that the wind is blowing. In this instance, I have 
formed at least two beliefs. First, I formed the belief that the trees are moving in a certain 
way (call this belief X), and then because of belief X, I then formed the belief that the 
wind is blowing (call this belief Y). Clearly belief Y is dependent on belief X, but not 
visa versa; belief X is not dependent on belief Y. So there are two kinds of beliefs here. 
On the one hand there seem to be beliefs that are formed in response to other beliefs that 
we hold, and on the other hand, there are those beliefs that are in some way more 
fundamental than others. Given this distinction, we can begin to understand the three 
theories about how beliefs must relate to each in order for belief Y to be justified.  
Let’s start with the first theory: foundationalism. A person is a foundationalist if 
belief Y in the above scenario can only be justified if (1) belief X is properly basic and 
(2) belief Y is appropriately formed on the basis of belief X. A belief is a basic belief if it 
is not formed on the basis of any other beliefs; the belief is immediate, non-inferential. If 
the belief is both held independently of any other beliefs, or in other words if it is basic, 
and if it is justified, then it is properly basic. Typically, beliefs are considered to be 
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properly basic beliefs if they are evident to the senses or if they are beliefs that are self-
evident, such as the laws of logic (e.g., the law of excluded middle, the law of non-
contradiction, etc.) or laws of mathematics (e.g., the distributive law, the associative law, 
etc.). For the foundationalist, in order for any inferential belief (i.e., non-basic beliefs) to 
be justified, it must be formed on the basis of basic beliefs. Perhaps an inferential belief 
could just be one in a chain of inferential beliefs, but the foundation on which all of the 
other inferential beliefs are supported must be a properly basic belief. So in the above 
scenario, belief Y is justified because it is formed on the basis of a belief that is itself 
non-inferential—it is properly basic.  
As we have seen, foundationalists believe that most beliefs are justified on the 
basis of other, more foundational beliefs, but they also assume a belief can be justified 
independently of any other beliefs that a person might hold. But what if one rejects that a 
belief could possibly be justified in such a way? Perhaps we rarely reflect on the reasons 
we form perceptual beliefs, but if we did, we would see that perceptual beliefs are 
themselves merely one stop on a long line of beliefs. Perhaps there is no such thing as a 
basic belief after all. If this is the case, one is then left with two basic ways to think about 
the architecture of belief.45 The first of these alternatives to foundationalism is infinitism. 
The infinitist holds that a belief can, without exception, be justified only if it is based on 
good reasons. Suppose I believe a certain proposition P1. On infinitism, P1 can only be 
justified it is appropriately related to my belief P2. However, P2 is only justified if it is 
appropriately related to my belief P3, and on it goes ad infinitum. Furthermore, in this 
infinite chain of beliefs, no proposition may ever repeat itself. For example, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45.	  Really	  I	  should	  say	  one	  is	  left	  with	  two	  typical	  ways	  to	  think	  about	  the	  architecture	  of	  belief,	  because	  while	  there	  are	  perhaps	  a	  number	  of	  other	  ways	  to	  think	  about	  this	  issue,	  the	  three	  ways	  I	  have	  outlined	  are	  the	  three	  standard	  ways	  to	  think	  about	  the	  architecture	  of	  belief.	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inferential chain could never be something like P1, because P2, because P3, because P1. If 
the chain ever did repeat, it would be circular, and circular reasoning can never justify a 
belief in a way that counts as knowledge. Therefore, the inferential chain necessarily 
extends infinitely (thus the name infinitism).46 Of course we may never consciously 
follow the belief chain infinitely backward, but on infinitism, we conceivably could were 
we given an infinite amount of time.  
Given this definition of infinitism, it should be clear that Thomas B. Warren 
cannot be an infinitist. Recall that Warren is an internalist about knowledge; a belief can 
only be justified if a person has internal access to the reasons for the justification of that 
belief. But if Warren were an infinitist, no belief could be justified. If I am justified in 
believing P1, according to Warren, I must conform with the law of rationality and believe 
P1 only if I have access to good reasons for P1. Suppose I cite P2 as evidence for P1. 
Clearly this is a reason, but is it a good reason? Well, according to the law of rationality, 
P2 is only a good reason if I have access to good reasons for believing P2, so of course I 
would also need to have access to P3 as evidence for P2, which is evidence for P1, and so 
this chain goes on infinitely. But of course I am only finite. By definition it is impossible 
for me to have access to an infinite chain of reasons all at once. Even if it were 
theoretically possible for me to follow the infinite belief chain given an infinite amount of 
time, this is not enough to satisfy an internalist conception of justification.47 A belief is 
justified at time t, if and only if I can explain upon reflection at t how I know a certain 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46.	  For	  thorough	  accounts	  of	  infinitism,	  see	  Jeremy	  Fantl,	  “Modest	  Infinitism”	  in	  Canadian	  
Journal	  of	  Philosophy	  33	  (2003):	  537-­‐62;	  Peter	  D.	  Klein,	  “Infinitism	  and	  the	  Epistemic	  Regress	  Problem”	  in	  Stefan	  Tolksdorf,	  ed.	  Berlin	  Studies	  in	  Knowledge	  Research,	  vol.	  4,	  Conceptions	  of	  
Knowledge	  (Berlin:	  De	  Gruyter).	  	  47.	  This	  is	  a	  similar	  argument	  to	  that	  of	  Richard	  Fumerton	  in	  Metaepistemology	  and	  
Skepticism	  (Lanham,	  MD:	  Rowman	  &	  Littlefield,	  1995).	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belief to be true. So Warren could not simultaneously be an internalist and an infinitist, 
and since it is clear that he is indeed an internalist, this rules out infinitism as the 
framework for understanding Warren’s conception of the structure of belief. 
This brings us to coherentism. Like the infinitist, the coherentist maintains that a 
belief can, without exception, be justified only if it is based on good reasons. However, 
coherentism differs from infinitism in the following way. Coherentists hold that a belief 
can be justified only if it coheres with the total set of beliefs already held by the knower. 
On this view, a belief could not possibly be justified independently of any other beliefs, 
because a belief is only justified if it coheres with a larger set of beliefs. Foundationalists 
would have us think of the structure of belief like a skyscraper, with basic beliefs forming 
the foundation upon which every subsequent floor of the building must be supported. But 
coherentists see the structure of belief more like a machine, with each belief being a cog 
in the greater whole; if a new cog is introduced, it must fit in the grand mechanical 
scheme or else it just will not work. If this is right, no belief is more critical than any 
other. Perhaps certain cogs are larger or pull a heavier load, but ultimately, it takes every 
cog available for the machine to function properly. So if I look outside and form the 
belief that the wind is blowing based on the movement of the tree branches, that belief is 
justified for me only if it coheres with an enormous number of beliefs I have about the 
way trees work, perhaps including past experiences on windy days, what I understand 
about the weather, and a number of other beliefs I might have. If my belief coheres with 
those beliefs in the appropriate way, it is justified.48  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48.	  For	  an	  extended	  account	  of	  coherentism,	  see	  Laurence	  BonJour,	  The	  Structure	  of	  
Empirical	  Knowledge	  (Cambridge	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1985);	  Jonathan	  Kvanvig,	  The	  Value	  
of	  Knowledge	  and	  the	  Pursuit	  of	  Understanding	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2007).	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On the face of it, conceiving of Warren’s epistemology as coherentist supplies 
significant explanatory power. After all, Warren is adamant that one must only “draw 
such conclusions as are warranted by the evidence.”49 Based on this statement, there 
seems to be no room for a belief to be both basic and justified; beliefs must be based on 
antecedent evidence. Furthermore, viewing Warren’s epistemology as coherentist begins 
to make good sense of his apologetic strategy. In arguing for the existence of God, 
Warren typically makes several different arguments supporting the existence of God that 
could each stand alone, but when considered together, cohere in such a way as to make 
the case for the existence of God that much stronger.50 If we are to understand this 
method in terms of coherentism, it seems that what justifies each of these arguments is 
their coherence within a larger belief system. 
There are, however, other aspects of Warren’s epistemology that do not fit the 
coherentist pattern. For one, Warren seems to indicate at times that certain beliefs may 
not actually rely on a preponderance of evidence for their justification. Of course there 
are many things one can only know by honoring the law of rationality, but for others he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   49.	  Warren,	  The	  God	  Question,	  22,	  Emphasis	  mine.	  	  50.	  In	  “We	  Can	  Know	  That	  God	  Is,”	  (Vienna,	  WV:	  Warren	  Christian	  Apologetics	  Center,	  2010):	  3-­‐4,	  Warren	  writes	  of	  many	  arguments	  that	  together	  demand	  the	  conclusion	  that	  God	  exists:	  	  	  When	  one	  considers	  the	  evidence	  which	  he	  himself	  constitutes	  he	  might	  consider	  his	  intellect	  (his	  ability	  to	  learn	  facts	  and	  to	  reason	  in	  a	  logical	  way	  about	  those	  facts),	  his	  conscience	  (the	  conviction	  that	  he	  ought	  to	  act	  in	  harmony	  with	  what	  he	  believes	  is	  right),	  his	  emotional	  capacity	  (ability	  to	  feel	  strongly,	  to	  love	  or	  to	  hate	  something),	  and	  his	  thoughts	  (which	  can	  evaluate	  a	  past	  action	  as	  to	  whether	  it	  was	  right	  or	  wrong).	  When	  one	  considers	  his	  body,	  he	  is	  aware	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  a	  marvelous	  mechanism—a	  single	  system	  which	  is	  comprised	  of	  a	  number	  of	  sub-­‐systems,	  all	  of	  which	  must	  work	  together	  in	  concert	  if	  one	  is	  to	  live	  or	  even	  to	  be	  very	  healthy.	  When	  one	  considers	  the	  item	  of	  his	  experience	  outside	  himself,	  he	  is	  aware	  of	  the	  non-­‐living	  physical	  universe—the	  earth	  and	  other	  planets	  and	  stars.	  The	  contingency	  of	  one’s	  self	  (and	  of	  the	  world	  in	  which	  each	  of	  us	  lives)	  is	  such	  as	  to	  warrant	  the	  deduction	  that	  the	  necessary	  being	  (God)	  exists….	  Any	  one	  of	  the	  above	  facts	  can	  be	  formulated	  into	  a	  sound	  argument	  the	  conclusion	  of	  which	  is:	  God	  exists.	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“does not have to set out a syllogism” in order for that belief to count as knowledge; 
evidence is not necessarily required.51 On foundationalism, this makes sense. For 
example, Warren’s belief that he has three children is a self-evident one (this is the belief 
he uses as an example in the Warren-Flew debate), immediately available to him by his 
senses, and so it is therefore a basic belief. Furthermore, Warren sees knowledge as built 
on particular presumptions that must be certain. At one point, Warren rails against 
atheists who hold a “Stratonician presumption” (i.e., that the burden of proof lies on 
theists rather than atheists). Warren agrees that the atheist that the burden of proof lies on 
the shoulders of the theist, but disagrees that the atheist does not also shoulder the burden 
of proof. Rather, no person can be allowed to base his claims on any “foolish 
presumptions,” but instead the theist and atheist must each build his case on the certainty 
of beliefs.52 Only chains of argumentation that begin with “self-evident truth, such as the 
law of rationality, the law of inference and/or implication, and the laws of thought” can 
count as justified.53 Finally, Warren himself refers to foundational arguments that, if 
refuted, collapse the rest of the argument with it. As Warren puts it, if a theory is founded 
on an untrue argument, the entire theory collapses.54 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   51.	  Warren-­‐Flew	  Debate,	  246	  	   52.	  Thomas	  B.	  Warren,	  “Atheism—Our	  Greatest	  Foe—And	  How	  to	  Deal	  With	  It,”	  Spiritual	  
Sword	  8,	  no.	  4	  (1977):	  2.	  	  53.	  Thomas	  B.	  Warren,	  “Some	  Things	  I	  Know,”	  Spiritual	  Sword	  13,	  no.	  4	  (1982):	  43.	  Furthermore,	  Warren,	  clearly	  revealing	  his	  foundationalist	  epistemology,	  says	  that	  without	  the	  self-­‐evident	  truths	  of	  logic,	  which	  can	  ultimately	  ground	  belief,	  no	  one	  could	  know	  anything,	  in	  Logic	  and	  
the	  Bible,	  22.	  	   54.	  Thomas	  B.	  Warren,	  The	  Warren-­‐Fuqua	  Debate	  (Fort	  Worth,	  TX:	  J.E.	  Snelson	  Printing	  Company,	  1985)	  15-­‐16.	  In	  his	  refutation	  of	  Fuqua,	  Warren	  writes,	  “To	  destroy	  a	  foundation	  is	  to	  destroy	  the	  building	  which	  rests	  upon	  it.	  The	  theory	  that	  salvation	  does	  not	  depend	  upon	  the	  dissolving	  of	  ‘sinful	  relationships’	  (as	  viewed	  by	  the	  law	  of	  Christ)	  which	  were	  entered	  while	  the	  parties	  involved	  were	  in	  the	  world	  is	  founded	  upon	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  world,	  not	  being	  subject	  to	  the	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2.4 Warren’s Epistemology: A Unified Account 
 We have so far explored two essential components of Thomas B. Warren’s 
epistemology: internalism and foundationalism. To this point, these two components have 
been considered separately. In order to get a complete picture of Warren’s epistemology, 
it is the task of this section to present a unified account of Warren’s epistemology, 
connecting both Warren’s internalism and foundationalism as well as unpacking any 
other relevant aspects of Warren’s epistemology. Once we have a grasp of Warren’s 
epistemology in general, we will finally examine how Warren’s general epistemology 
functions towards the pursuit of what is for Warren a particularly important desideratum: 
knowledge of God. 
 
2.4.1 Knowledge as Indubitable 
 So what would a unified account of Warren’s epistemology look like? Such an 
account starts with the view that, for Warren, beliefs are justified internally. That is, 
beliefs are justified only if the knower has taken the appropriate actions to consider the 
belief in the right way. So whether a belief is justified or not is within the volitional 
control of the agent (i.e., it is internally justified). This justification can come about in 
two ways. The first way a belief can be justified is if it is properly basic: it is, in other 
words, formed immediately by the senses or it is self-evidently true. The second way a 
belief can be justified is if it is appropriately inferred. An inferential belief is justified if it 
fulfills two criteria: first, it must be one belief in a series of justified, inferential beliefs 
that are ultimately based on a properly basic belief, and second, the belief must be formed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  law	  of	  Christ,	  cannot	  violate	  the	  law	  of	  Christ.	  If	  it	  can	  be	  proved	  that	  one	  person	  in	  the	  world	  violated	  the	  law	  of	  Christ,	  this	  foundation	  is	  thereby	  destroyed.	  When	  the	  foundation	  is	  destroyed,	  the	  whole	  theory	  is	  destroyed.”	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on the basis of good reasons that are accessible to the knower. This involves a person 
fulfilling her epistemic duty to do her due diligence in consideration of the belief, 
examining the issue as thoroughly as possible, not being in any way blameworthy should 
the belief be untrue, and honoring the law of rationality, which requires drawing only 
such conclusions as are warranted by the evidence. If a belief is to be justified, it can only 
be justified in these two ways. 
Together, Warren’s deontological internalism and his foundationalism function in 
such a way that for a belief to count as knowledge, that belief must be indubitable. In 
other words, for Warren, knowledge is certainty to the degree that one is beyond even the 
possibility of being mistaken.55 Warren is unmistakably clear about this. He writes,  
I know that the Bible is the inspired word of God. Let me make it abundantly 
clear that I am not claiming to know merely that there is a “high probability” that 
God exists or that the Bible is the word of God: I am saying that I know that God 
exists and the Bible is the word of God. By this I mean that I have such certainty 
about these matters that I cannot be wrong about them. 56 
 
If we understand Warren’s epistemology in light of the internalism and foundationalism 
described above, it becomes clear why Warren’s sees knowledge as indubitable.  
Suppose we sketch a genealogy of belief on Warren’s epistemology. According to 
Warren’s foundationalism, knowledge must start with a properly basic belief. Call this 
belief B1. By definition, B1 is self-evident. Based on this self-evident belief, a person may 
infer another belief. Call this B2. But such an inference is only justified if that person 
does his due diligence, is in no way epistemically blameworthy, and honors the law of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55.	  Warren,	  The	  God	  Question,	  22.	  Elsewhere,	  Warren	  states	  that	  knowledge	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  certainty,	  not	  of	  mere	  guessing	  or	  even	  of	  strong	  probability;	  it	  must	  be	  certain	  See	  “The	  Challenge	  of	  Agnosticism	  in	  the	  Church	  Itself,”	  Spiritual	  Sword	  11	  (July	  1980):	  1.	  	  56.	  Warren,	  “Some	  Things	  I	  know,”	  Spiritual	  Sword	  13	  (July	  1982),	  43.	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rationality. If he fulfills these epistemic obligations, he will have made this inference in 
such a way as to entail the necessity of it; it will be a necessary inference, held together 
by sound reasoning based on evidence. Perhaps he draws yet another inference B3, which 
is based on B2, which is based on self-evident belief B1. But this inference is also only 
justified if it is a necessary inference held together by sound reasoning. And so on the 
belief chain could go, but no matter how far down the chain we proceed, every inferential 
belief must be made in such a way as to be certain. Because each of these inferences must 
be made necessarily, each belief is as strong as the belief on which it is based. 
Furthermore, since the entire series of beliefs is based on a self-evident truth, every 
subsequent belief can also be held with absolute certainty. 
 
2.4.2 Warren’s Religious Epistemology 
 How does this apply to religious beliefs? After all, knowledge that God exists is a 
rather complicated proposition. There are many different issues one must consider in 
order to arrive at the conclusion that God exists. It seems clear then, that knowledge of 
God is not basic; it is inferential.57 How then does Warren suppose one comes to know 
that God exists? We have explored his general epistemology, but what is his religious 
epistemology? Understanding belief in God as an inferential belief is the first step in 
understanding Warren’s religious epistemology. Since it is inferential, belief in God can 
only be justified if it is based on adequate evidence.58 So to demonstrate that knowledge 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57.	  At	  least	  for	  Warren,	  knowledge	  of	  God	  is	  not	  basic.	  It	  should	  be	  noted,	  though,	  that	  this	  is	  not	  an	  uncontested	  claim.	  Some	  epistemologists	  have	  argued	  at	  length	  that	  knowledge	  that	  God	  exists	  is	  in	  fact	  properly	  basic.	  Most	  notably,	  Alvin	  Plantinga	  makes	  this	  argument	  in	  Warranted	  
Christian	  Belief	  (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). Nicholas Wolterstorff makes a similar, but 
more abbreviated argument in “Can Belief in God Be Rational If It Has No Foundations?” in Faith and 
Rationality: Reason and Belief in God (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983).	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of God is possible, Warren takes it upon himself to show that there is indeed adequate 
evidence to warrant the conclusion that God exists. He does this by constructing multiple 
arguments, each of which could stand as a pillar on its own to warrant the conclusion that 
God exists, but when considered together, form such a strong foundation of support as to 
make it overwhelmingly clear that God must in fact exist. Warren bases each of these 
arguments on the self-evident truths of logic, such as the law of non-contradiction (i.e., 
no proposition can be both true and false). From the law of non-contradiction, for 
example, one may infer that God either exists or he does not exist. From this point, 
Warren then goes on to construct a number of syllogisms. One is the teleological 
argument in which Warren argues that the degree of complexity and functionality of the 
universe is so great that it can only be accounted for if God created the universe.59 He 
also makes another variation on the teleological argument in which he argues that there 
are two ways to account for the existence of such a complex organism as human beings: 
evolution or spontaneous creation by a divine agent (based on the law of excluded 
middle). Warren argues that evolution is both evidentially bankrupt and also 
philosophically contradictory, and therefore human beings were created by a divine 
agent.60 Warren also makes an argument from the existence of objective morals. He 
argues that objective morality can only exist if it is grounded in God, and since there is 
agreement that objective morality exists, God must therefore exist.61 These arguments 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58.	  No	  other	  way	  of	  going	  about	  it	  can	  be	  acceptable.	  As	  Warren	  puts	  it,	  “It	  is	  not	  pleasing	  to	  God	  for	  any	  man	  to	  draw	  conclusions	  (in	  regard	  to	  God’s	  will)	  for	  which	  he	  does	  not	  have	  adequate	  evidence”	  Logic	  and	  the	  Bible,	  91.	  	   59.	  Warren,	  Warren-­‐Flew	  Debate,	  207-­‐221.	  	  60.	  Ibid.,	  135-­‐141.	  	   61.	  Ibid.,	  236-­‐238;	  See	  also	  Thomas	  B.	  Warren,	  “We	  Can	  Know	  That	  God	  Is.”	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and others like them are all founded on self-evident truths and then reasoned, so it is 
argued, in a sound way that necessarily demands the conclusion that God exists.62  
 Not only does Warren maintain that these arguments are more than enough to 
support the conclusion that God exists, he further argues that atheism is without any 
support at all. For Warren, it is not as though there are decent arguments to be weighed 
on both sides but that the weight of theistic arguments outweigh atheist ones. Rather, 
Warren argues that atheistic arguments have no weight at all.63 Warren sets out to show 
that all of the supposed pillars on which the conclusion of atheism is founded are easily 
knocked over if they are only exposed to the light of critical inquiry.64 In this way, 
Warren’s religious epistemology supposes what I call the imminent rationality of 
Christian belief. By that I mean that Warren’s modus operandi in arguing for the 
existence of God is to build an argument for the existence of God, answer any and all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62.	  These	  arguments	  together	  are	  not	  a	  cumulative	  case	  argument.	  Rather	  Warren	  sees	  these	  arguments	  as	  self-­‐supporting	  and	  sufficient	  for	  belief	  in	  God	  to	  be	  indubitable.	  On	  a	  rhetorical	  level,	  Warren	  hopes	  that	  if	  one	  argument	  is	  not	  convincing,	  another	  will	  be	  persuasive	  enough	  to	  convince	  an	  unbeliever	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  God.	  	  63.	  Warren	  writes	  of	  those	  who	  do	  not	  believe	  in	  God	  or	  that	  the	  Bible	  is	  the	  word	  of	  God,	  “It	  is	  simply	  a	  fact	  that	  the	  more	  a	  teacher	  of	  false	  doctrine	  is	  pressed	  to	  give	  the	  sound	  argument	  which	  proves	  his	  basic	  affirmation,	  the	  more	  he	  will	  turn	  against	  and	  castigate	  logic	  in	  general	  and	  the	  law	  of	  rationality	  in	  particular….	  Again	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  it	  has	  well	  been	  said	  that	  no	  man	  turns	  against	  reason	  until	  reason	  turns	  against	  him.”	  Logic	  and	  the	  Bible,	  115.	  	  64.	  In	  one	  instance,	  Warren	  writes	  of	  atheists’	  impossible	  task	  to	  set	  out	  a	  good	  argument	  for	  their	  beliefs	  saying,	  “I	  have	  written	  to	  a	  number	  of	  natural	  scientists	  (who	  hold	  full	  professorships	  in	  the	  various	  departments	  of	  the	  natural	  sciences	  in	  the	  prestigious	  universities	  of	  this	  country)	  asking	  them	  to	  set	  forth	  such	  an	  argument	  [to	  show	  atheism	  is	  true].	  To	  this	  date	  I	  have	  not	  received	  even	  one	  attempt	  by	  any	  of	  these	  scientists	  to	  do	  so.	  Instead	  of	  setting	  forth	  the	  argument	  these	  scientists	  either	  attempt	  to	  explain	  why	  they	  are	  under	  no	  obligation	  to	  do	  so	  or	  they	  attempt	  to	  avoid	  the	  whole	  affair	  by	  some	  facetious	  remark….	  I	  submit	  no	  evolutionist	  can	  offer	  a	  valid	  argument,	  with	  true	  premises,	  the	  conclusion	  of	  which	  affirms	  that	  the	  theory	  of	  evolution	  is	  true.	  I	  am	  further	  persuaded	  that	  evolutionists	  will	  not	  face	  up	  to	  their	  obligation	  of	  setting	  forth	  a	  precise	  and	  valid	  argument	  for	  their	  theory	  because	  they	  cannot	  do	  so”	  in	  “Responses	  to	  Evolution,”	  Sufficient	  Evidence:	  A	  Journal	  of	  
Christian	  Apologetics	  1,	  no.	  1	  (2011):	  19.	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objections to his argument, and refute all arguments against the existence of God.65 In so 
doing, Warren believes his arguments to be so impenetrable and his critiques of atheism 
to be so devastating as to make belief in God imminently reasonable. As Warren puts it,  
While we recognize the possible complexity which might be involved in 
argumentation for the existence of God, we insist that the evidence is so obvious 
and, in a sense, so simple that everyone in the world (of sufficient intelligence to 
be held accountable for his actions) is capable of seeing that evidence and of 
drawing the conclusions which it warrants, namely that God does exist. 66 
 
For Warren, no rational person could consider his arguments for the existence of God 
without also realizing the truth of them. In this way, belief in God is imminently 
reasonable. 
 Warren, therefore, claims that belief in God is justified because it is based on self-
evident truths, such as the laws of logic. These laws form the foundation of further 
inferences that together are built in such a way as to demand the conclusion that God 
exists. Furthermore, the arguments of atheism are profoundly tenuous according to 
Warren. These facts (i.e., the overwhelming case for the existence of God and the tenuous 
case against it) together make belief in God imminently rational—no rational person 
could consider Warren’s arguments without also realizing the truth of them. This brings 
together the various components of Warren’s general epistemology in a succinct way. It 
relies on self-evident truths as the foundation of a series of inferential beliefs. That chain 
is itself held together by necessary inferences, formed in fulfillment of one’s epistemic 
obligations to do his due diligence, not to be in any way intellectually blameworthy, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   65.	  Basil	  Mitchell	  makes	  some	  interesting	  observations	  about	  this	  strategy	  in	  Christian	  apologetics	  in	  his	  essay	  “How	  to	  Play	  Theological	  Ping-­‐Pong”	  in	  How	  to	  Play	  Theological	  Ping-­‐Pong:	  
Essays	  on	  Faith	  and	  Reason	  (Grand	  Rapids,	  MI:	  William	  B.	  Eerdmans	  Publishing	  Company,	  1990):	  166-­‐183.	  	   66.	  Thomas	  B.	  Warren,	  “We	  Can	  Know	  That	  God	  Is,”	  4.	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to honor the law of rationality. If these obligations are kept, the beliefs in the inferential 
series of beliefs will each logically necessitate the truth of the belief before it, reaching 
back ultimately to the self-evident belief on which they are all founded.67 Knowledge 
therefore, and even knowledge of God, is indubitable; it is beyond the possibility of being 
doubted.68 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have provided a descriptive analysis of the epistemology of 
Thomas B. Warren, its main components being his deontological internalism and his 
foundationalism. I have not, however, critically examined this epistemology that 
underlies Warren’s apologetic method; that is, I have only sought in this chapter to give 
the facts of Warren’s epistemology, but I have yet to offer anything like an assessment of 
its strong and weak points. In fact, as far as I can tell, because Warren’s epistemology has 
not before been laid out in a formal and systematic way, his epistemology has so far 
avoided close scrutiny. If one were to critically analyze this underlying epistemology 
then, what would be uncovered? Do some of Warren’s fundamental epistemological 
commitments have fatal flaws? And if so, what are they? It is to these questions that we 
now turn.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67.	  Warren	  is	  what	  Alvin	  Plantinga	  would	  call	  a	  “classical	  foundationalist.”	  Plantinga	  describes	  classical	  foundationalism	  and	  its	  relation	  to	  religious	  epistemology	  in	  “Reason	  and	  Belief	  in	  God,”	  Faith	  and	  Rationality:	  Reason	  and	  Belief	  in	  God	  (Notre	  Dame:	  University	  of	  Notre	  Dame	  Press,	  1983):	  16-­‐93.	  My	  analysis	  of	  Warren’s	  particular	  epistemology	  is	  deeply	  informed	  by	  Plantinga’s	  analysis	  of	  classical	  foundationalism.	  Nicholas	  Wolterstorff	  also	  traces	  the	  history	  of	  this	  tradition	  in	  “Epistemology	  of	  Religion,”	  The	  Blackwell	  Guide	  to	  Epistemology,	  John	  Greco	  and	  Ernest	  Sosa,	  eds. 
(Malden,	  Mass.:	  Blackwell,	  1999):	  303-­‐324.	  	  68.	  Warren’s	  internalist	  foundationalism	  is	  also	  expressed	  in	  his	  biblical	  hermeneutic.	  William	  Abraham	  describes	  a	  similar	  kind	  of	  hermeneutic	  as	  “theological	  foundationalism.”	  See	  
Canon	  and	  Criterion	  in	  Christian	  Theology	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  1998):	  111-­‐138.	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CHAPTER III 
 
THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF THOMAS B. WARREN: A CRITIQUE 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
  
 I have so far framed Warren’s epistemology in terms of his foundationalism and 
his deontological internalism. That is, knowledge of God is ultimately founded on and 
justified by non-inferential, incorrigible belief(s). With these beliefs as the foundation, 
additional inferential beliefs can count as knowledge only if a person fulfills his 
epistemic obligations to do his due diligence, only to behave as is intellectually 
permissible, and to honor the law of rationality, which involves drawing only such 
conclusions as are warranted by the evidence. I argue in this chapter, however, that some 
of these criteria lead to an epistemic dead end; the strong internalist conditions essential 
to Warren’s answer to questions regarding knowledge of God not only doom his religious 
epistemology to agnosticism, but, if taken to their logical end, doom it more generally to 
radical skepticism as well. To demonstrate this claim, this chapter is organized into three 
sections, each articulating a separate and distinct problem with Warren’s epistemology. 
Namely, these three problems are Warren’s definition of knowledge as indubitable, his 
conception of internalist foundationalism, and his view of knowledge of God as 
imminently reasonable. Each of these three critiques could stand on their own to 
demonstrate the fatal weaknesses of Warren’s epistemology, but, when considered
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together, they provide an even more compelling rationale for rejecting certain aspects of 
his epistemology.69 
 
3.2 The Problem of Certainty 
 Thomas B. Warren sees knowledge as indubitable. Probability is not enough; as 
he puts it, knowledge requires that a person be certain about a proposition to the degree 
that he could not possibly be wrong about it.70 Warren is not merely claiming that for a 
belief to count as knowledge that it must be true. This would hardly be controversial. One 
cannot know that the earth is flat because the earth is round. In other words, a proposition 
can only be known if it is a true one. Warren’s claim about the certainty of knowledge is 
much stronger. Warren’s conception of knowledge as certainty can be formally defined 
as follows: 
(KaC) Subject S knows proposition P iff S’s belief that P must be true, in that S’s 
reasons for believing that P entail or guarantee the truth that P. 
 
In order for the reasons for a particular belief to necessarily entail the truth of it, there can 
be no possible proposition that would contradict the belief in question. For example, I 
believe the proposition “2+2=4.” If I am to be certain that this proposition is true, there 
can be no other possible propositions that would contradict it and I must also be aware 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69.	  I	  want	  to	  note	  from	  the	  outset	  that	  although	  I	  spend	  this	  chapter	  pointing	  out	  the	  weaknesses	  of	  Warren’s	  epistemology,	  I	  will	  take	  up	  the	  strengths	  of	  Warren’s	  epistemology	  in	  the	  following	  chapter	  and	  offer	  some	  suggestions	  for	  ways	  to	  build	  on	  those	  strengths	  in	  productive	  ways.	  So	  although	  Warren’s	  epistemology	  has	  decided	  weaknesses,	  I	  will	  not	  advocate	  rejecting	  it	  wholesale.	  	  70.	  In	  an	  article	  for	  the	  Spiritual	  Sword,	  Warren	  writes,	  “I	  know	  that	  the	  Bible	  is	  the	  inspired	  word	  of	  God.	  Let	  me	  make	  it	  abundantly	  clear	  that	  I	  am	  not	  claiming	  to	  know	  merely	  that	  there	  is	  a	  “high	  probability”	  that	  god	  exists	  or	  that	  the	  Bible	  is	  the	  word	  of	  God:	  I	  am	  saying	  that	  I	  know	  that	  God	  exists	  and	  that	  the	  Bible	  is	  the	  word	  of	  God.	  By	  this	  I	  mean	  that	  I	  have	  such	  certainty	  about	  these	  matters	  that	  I	  cannot	  be	  wrong	  about	  them,”	  in	  “Some	  Things	  I	  Know,”	  43.	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that there are no possible contradictory propositions of “2+2=4.” If I am aware that there 
are no possible contradictory propositions, I can be certain of it. 
The above definition (KaC) makes a bold claim in that it requires a lot of a person 
in order for her to have knowledge. Suppose I go to the zoo one day to visit the lone 
zebra housed there. I go directly to the zebra enclosure, I see the sign that reads “zebra,” 
and right before me I see an animal that looks like a zebra. In this scenario, there is an 
extremely high probability that what I am looking at is a zebra; I regularly visit this zebra 
enclosure, have talked to the zookeeper on numerous occasions about this particular 
zebra, and receive a newsletter detailing any relevant news about changes at the zoo. 
Based on the substantial evidence I have to consider, it would seem that I am well within 
my epistemic rights to believe there is a zebra before me. But can I be certain I am 
looking at a zebra? Perhaps the very night before this visit, one of the new zookeepers, 
Kurt, who was responsible for feeding the zebra, inadvertently fed the wrong food to the 
zebra resulting in its death. Kurt, not wanting to lose his job, secretly painted a mule to 
look exactly like the old zebra.71 Obviously this scenario is highly unlikely, but it is not 
altogether impossible, and in order for me to be certain that this very scenario did not 
happen, I would need to believe that the animal before me is a zebra in such a way as to 
necessarily eliminate the possibility that Kurt painted a mule to look like a zebra. In 
short, what seems like a rather simple belief quickly becomes quite involved if it must be 
certain in order to count as knowledge. It is theoretically possible that I could still 
justifiably believe that what is before me is a zebra in a way that cannot be doubted—
maybe I have followed the zebra around its whole life in order to ensure there is no foul 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71.	  This	  thought	  experiment	  is	  originally	  laid	  out	  by	  Daniel	  Howard-­‐Snyder,	  Frances	  Howard-­‐Snyder,	  and	  Neil	  Feit,	  "Infallibilism	  and	  Gettier's	  Legacy,"	  Philosophy	  and	  Phenomenological	  
Research,	  2003,	  304-­‐327.	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play involved—but this of course would practically never happen. Herein lies the primary 
issue with defining knowledge as certainty about a given proposition. 
 The consequence of knowledge as certainty (KaC) is that very few of the beliefs 
that we ordinarily hold count as knowledge. In order for the reasons for a particular belief 
to necessarily entail the truth of it, there can be no possible proposition that would 
contradict the belief in question. But what beliefs satisfy this criterion? Perhaps certain 
self-evident beliefs satisfy it. Beliefs such as that I felt pain when I hit my head yesterday, 
the belief that the wall in my office appears white to me, and the belief the propositions 
“X is Y” and “X is not Y” are mutually exclusive are all beliefs that no possible 
proposition could contradict.72 But very few other beliefs cannot be contradicted by some 
possible proposition. Even perceptual beliefs could be refuted by other possible beliefs. 
As long as beliefs must be certain in order to count as knowledge, Descartes’s evil demon 
will continue to plague epistemology.73 But even such theoretical possibilities aside, we 
know from experience that perceptual beliefs can be deceptive. What I thought was a cat 
behind the bush in my yard might only have been a shadow, or what seemed like an oasis 
in the desert might have simply been a mirage. But the grips of skepticism do not stop 
there. Even beliefs that seem patently obvious have trouble standing up to such a radical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72.	  The	  wall	  in	  my	  office	  appearing	  to	  me	  to	  be	  white	  is	  different	  than	  the	  wall	  actually	  being	  white,	  it	  should	  be	  noted.	  	  73.	  In	  his	  Meditations,	  Descartes	  speculated	  that	  there	  could	  be	  an	  evil	  demon	  that	  has	  undertaken	  to	  constantly	  deceive	  him.	  He	  writes,	  “Accordingly	  I	  shall	  now	  suppose…	  that	  some	  malignant	  genius	  exceedingly	  powerful	  and	  cunning	  has	  devoted	  all	  his	  powers	  in	  the	  deceiving	  of	  me;	  I	  shall	  suppose	  that	  the	  sky,	  the	  earth,	  colors,	  shapes,	  sounds	  and	  all	  external	  things	  are	  illusions	  and	  impostures	  of	  which	  this	  evil	  genius	  has	  availed	  himself	  for	  the	  abuse	  of	  my	  credulity;	  I	  shall	  consider	  myself	  as	  having	  no	  hands,	  no	  eyes,	  no	  flesh,	  no	  blood,	  nor	  any	  sense,	  but	  as	  falsely	  opining	  myself	  to	  possess	  all	  these	  things.”	  Descartes,	  translated	  by	  Norman	  Kemp	  Smith,	  Descartes:	  
Philosophical	  Writing	  (New	  York:	  Random	  House,	  1958),	  181.	  The	  possibility	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  such	  an	  evil	  demon,	  Descartes	  argues,	  prevents	  him	  from	  having	  knowledge	  about	  perceptual	  beliefs	  since	  perceptual	  beliefs	  can	  be	  doubted.	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demand that a belief must be certain in order to count as knowledge. Think again about 
the proposition “2+2=4.” Even if there were no possible propositions that could 
contradict it, how would I know that? Could we really rule it out that there is not some 
instance where “2+2=4?” is contradicted by some proposition that has so far alluded me? 
After all, I do not have access to all possible propositions; I am not omniscient. A number 
of beliefs in the past were considered blindingly obvious, such as that the earth is the 
center of the universe, that bacteria appears spontaneously on food, and that the earth is 
flat, but all of these beliefs turned out to be false. So if beliefs in the past that were 
considered obvious turned out false and if one does not have access to all possible 
propositions, then how would one rule out the proposition “there is a possible proposition 
that contradicts ‘2+2=4?’”74 
If it is not possible to be certain about beliefs as simple as “a cat is under the 
bush,” more complex beliefs, such as “the God of the New Testament exists,” are even 
less qualified to count as knowledge. Perhaps there really is a God, but he takes sole 
delight in deceiving human beings. As such, maybe he set it about that many books 
would be written about him, including the Bible, the Quran, and the Homeric Hymns, but 
all of which say almost nothing true about him. This, of course, seems highly unlikely, 
but it is not outside the realm of theoretical possibility, so one could not be certain about 
it. While Warren’s criterion that knowledge entails certainty does not itself doom his 
epistemology to universal skepticism, it is so pervasive that it does eliminate the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74.	  On	  this	  point,	  Robert	  Audi	  offers	  the	  helpful	  distinction	  between	  the	  infallibility	  of	  a	  belief	  and	  certainty	  of	  it.	  He	  writes,	  “In	  a	  way,	  uncertainty	  cuts	  deeper	  than	  fallibility:	  for	  even	  if	  I	  believe	  a	  theorem	  of	  logic	  that	  cannot	  be	  false	  and	  so	  have	  an	  infallible	  belief,	  I	  may	  not	  be	  warranted	  in	  my	  proof	  and	  cannot	  be	  justifiedly	  certain.	  Uncertainty	  arises	  where	  one’s	  grounds	  are	  not	  conclusive,	  and	  it	  can	  arise	  even	  when	  one’s	  belief	  is	  infallible.	  Thus,	  even	  the	  infallibility	  of	  a	  belief	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  render	  it	  knowledge.”	  See	  Epistemology:	  A	  Contemporary	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Theory	  of	  
Knowledge	  (New	  York:	  Routledge,	  2011):	  294.	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possibility that a large majority of our beliefs could count as knowledge and severely 
restricts the number of beliefs that do count as knowledge. Furthermore, it dooms his 
religious epistemology to agnosticism if taken to its logical end. 
Given the resulting pervasive skepticism, it is worth considering whether an 
appropriate definition of knowledge must require that beliefs be certain in order to count 
as knowledge. If the result of such a criterion is counter-intuitive ways of thinking about 
knowledge, and if there is no a priori reason for including such a criterion, rejecting this 
requirement allows for the possibility that many of our beliefs do in fact count as 
knowledge. If it is not necessary that certainty, as a subjective state, is a precondition for 
knowledge, one could even know that God exists. The idea that knowledge entails 
certainty (KaC) should therefore be rejected. 
 
3.3  The Regress Problem 
 Warren’s deontological internalism is problematic as well. More specifically, it is 
subject to the infinite regress problem. In short, the regress problem is an argument that 
claims internalism about knowledge necessarily demands that in order for one to be 
justified, one must hold an infinite number of beliefs of ever-increasing complexity.75 
The argument goes as follows. Internalism requires by definition that subject S is justified 
in holding belief B only if (1) there is something, X, that contributes to the justification of 
B and that (2) S is actually aware of X in such a way that S justifiably believes that X is in 
some way relevant to the appropriateness of holding B. Based on this definition, in order 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75.	  The	  following	  version	  of	  the	  regress	  problem	  is	  articulated	  by	  Michael	  Bergmann	  in 
Justification	  Without	  Awareness:	  A	  Defense	  of	  Epistemic	  Externalism	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  2006),	  14-­‐19.	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for S’s belief B to be justified on the basis of something, X, S must further believe the 
following proposition: 
 P1: X1 is in some way relevant to the appropriateness of holding of B. 
But in order for P1 to be justified, S must further believe yet another proposition: 
P2: X2 is in some way relevant to the appropriateness of holding the belief that X1 
is in some way relevant to the appropriateness of holding B. 
 
But in order for P2 to be justified, S must believe yet another proposition: 
P3: X3 is in some way relevant to the appropriateness of holding the belief that X2 
is in some way relevant to the appropriateness of holding that X1 is in some way 
relevant to the appropriateness of holding B. 
 
And so on the belief chain could go infinitely, with each subsequent belief becoming 
increasingly complex. Since no person could possibly hold an infinite number of 
infinitely complex beliefs, no person could be justified in believing anything. 
 This version of the regress problem is supposedly solved by appealing to some 
version of internalist foundationalism, wherein the belief chain does not run on infinitely 
because it can ultimately rest on a belief that requires no antecedent belief(s) in order for 
it to be justified. In other words, a series of inferential beliefs can ultimately be founded 
on a basic belief. But appealing to properly basic beliefs as the foundation of knowledge 
does not provide a satisfactory answer to the regress problem either, as Wilfrid Sellars 
argues in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.”76 The internalist foundationalism 
answer to the regress problem assumes that a belief can be justified on the basis of a 
properly basic belief. But how would one know that a belief can in fact be justified by an 
antecedent justified, non-inferential belief? First of all, one would need to hold the belief 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76.	  “Empiricism	  and	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Mind,”	  Minnesota	  Studies	  in	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Science,	  
1:	  Foundations	  of	  Science	  and	  the	  Concepts	  of	  Psychology	  and	  Psychoanalysis,	  ed.	  H.	  Feigl	  and	  M.	  Scriven	  (Minneapolis:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  1956),	  253-­‐329.	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B1 that there is something, X, that justifies the idea that a belief can be justified by 
another, non-inferential belief, but in order to hold that belief, one would need to hold a 
further belief B2, that there is something, X2, that justifies B1, that a belief can be justified 
by another, non-inferential belief. And so on the chain could go infinitely.  
To understand Sellars’ argument in less formal terms, consider the following 
example. Suppose Mary forms a belief even as simple as that there is a bird outside her 
window. According to internalist foundationalism, Mary’s belief that there is a bird 
outside her window is only justified if (1) she has access to a good reason for believing 
there is a bird outside her window and if (2) Mary knows why the reason for her belief is 
a good one. Imagine Mary’s reason for believing that there is a bird outside her window 
is that she actually saw it there. According to foundationalism, this satisfies the first 
condition (1). But there is still intellectual work for Mary to do in order for the belief to 
be justified; she must also know why seeing a bird outside her window counts as a good 
reason.77 Mary, being the good student that she is, knows from her philosophy class that 
her perceptual belief is a good one because perceptual beliefs are basic and can count as 
the foundation of knowledge. It may initially seem that this is enough to justify Mary’s 
belief that there is a bird outside her window, but as Sellars argues, in order for Mary to 
know that perceptual beliefs can count as the foundation of knowledge, she must further 
justify that belief based on a good reason. And if she could find a good reason for 
believing that perceptual beliefs can be the basis of knowledge, she would also need to 
know why that reason counts as a good one. On and on this problem could regress 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77.	  If	  a	  person	  denies	  this	  claim	  and	  instead	  holds	  that	  the	  belief	  can	  be	  justified	  so	  long	  as	  it	  is	  based	  on	  a	  basic	  belief,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  Mary	  knows	  why	  perceptual	  beliefs	  count	  as	  knowledge,	  then	  he	  is	  an	  externalist,	  not	  an	  internalist.	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infinitely. Sellars’ argument, therefore, demonstrates that even if internalist 
foundationalism were true, there would not actually be any way to know that it is true 
because knowing such would involve holding an infinite series of beliefs of ever-
increasing complexity. And if one cannot know that internalist foundationalism is true, 
one cannot know any other beliefs are true, since by definition, in order for a person to 
know any other belief, he must have internal access to how he knows it—something 
Sellars regress argument shows is not possible. 
 This does not mean that internalism is untrue or that foundationalism is untrue.78 
What it does mean is that if a person is both an internalist and a foundationalist, by his 
own definition, he cannot actually know anything and is doomed to radical skepticism; 
internalist foundationalism is self-defeating with regard to the belief that a person can 
have knowledge of at least some of his beliefs. If one believes that knowledge is possible, 
internalist foundationalism cannot be the answer. Thomas B. Warren’s epistemology, as I 
have argued, is a version of internalist foundationalism, and as such, it is subject to the 
infinite regress problem. Consequently, Warren’s epistemology is doomed to radical 
skepticism and, by extension, agnosticism as well. Like the conception of knowledge as 
certainty (KaC), there must also be significant modification to internalism and 
foundationalism, or one (or both) must be rejected entirely.79 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78.	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  be	  an	  internalist	  but	  not	  a	  foundationalist,	  and	  visa	  versa,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  be	  a	  foundationalist	  but	  not	  an	  internalist.	  	   79.	  William	  Alston	  offers	  a	  helpful	  distinction	  between	  classical	  foundationalism	  and	  what	  he	  calls	  “modest	  foundationalism”	  that	  could	  potentially	  save	  foundationalism	  from	  the	  problems	  stated	  in	  this	  section.	  See	  Beyond	  “Justification:”	  Dimensions	  of	  Epistemic	  Evaluation	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  2005):	  230-­‐235;	  William	  Alston,	  “Has	  Foundationalism	  Been	  Defeated,”	  
Philosophical	  Studies	  29,	  no.	  5	  (1976):	  287-­‐309.	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3.4 The Disagreement Problem 
 Warren sees belief in God as imminently reasonable—no rational person could 
consider his arguments for the existence of God without also realizing the truth of them.80 
A person is rational, according to Warren, if he conforms with the law of rationality, 
which is to draw only such conclusions as are warranted by the evidence.81 If the 
proposition that God exists is so imminently reasonable that any rational person will see 
the truth of it upon consideration, the implication of this is that if a person denies that 
God exists, he is either uninformed about the evidence or he has ulterior motivations for 
denying that God exists to the degree that his judgment about the evidence is severely 
clouded.82 Therefore, the fact that many people continue to (at times, strongly) deny that 
God exists sets up a philosophical dilemma. This dilemma can be expressed in an 
inconsistent set of four propositions, one of which must be denied in order to solve the 
dilemma. These propositions can be stated as follows: 
I. Any rational subject S, when presented with the evidence, will see that 
God exists. 
 
II. S is informed and reasons well. 
III. S desires the truth and wants to follow the evidence where it leads. 
IV. S denies that God exists. 
If belief in God is indeed imminently reasonable, all four propositions in the above 
inconsistent set cannot all be true. Denying any one of the propositions in the above set 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80.	  See	  footnote	  64	  	  81.	  See	  footnote	  31	  	  82.	  See	  footnote	  61	  and	  62	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will solve the dilemma, but such a denial of any one of them potentially leads to 
undesirable consequences.  
 It is conceivable that in some cases if a person denies that God exists, it is because 
he is either uninformed or he does not reason well (i.e., proposition II is false). In this 
case, belief in God may indeed be imminently reasonable and the non-believer may 
genuinely desire to follow the evidence where it leads, but he simply does not have the 
necessary evidence to draw such a conclusion; perhaps he has only been presented one 
side of the issue and/or has not seen atheism critically engaged. This could conceivably 
be the case in some instances, but it certainly not always the case. It is a strong claim to 
say that there are no cases where a highly informed and intelligent individual denies the 
existence of God. There are atheists whose entire lives are devoted to considering all of 
the possible evidence both for and against the existence of God, such as Michael 
Martin,83 Richard Gale,84 Daniel Dennett,85 and Paul Draper.86 It does not seem to be the 
case that if individuals such as these do not believe that God exists it is because they are 
unaware of the arguments for his existence or are not capable of understanding them; 
they are certainly aware of the arguments. Perhaps there are those that would nonetheless 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83.	  See	  Michael	  Martin,	  Atheism:	  A	  Philosophical	  Justification	  (Philadelphia:	  Temple	  University	  Press,	  1990).	  	  84.	  See	  Richard	  M.	  Gale,	  On	  the	  Nature	  and	  Existence	  of	  God	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1991).	  	  85.	  See	  Daniel	  Dennett	  and	  Alvin	  Plantinga,	  Science	  and	  Religion:	  Are	  They	  Compatible?	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2011).	  
86. See Paul Draper, The	  Problem	  of	  Evil,”	  in	  The	  Oxford	  Handbook	  of	  Philosophical	  Theology,	  ed.	  Thomas	  P.	  Flint	  and	  Michael	  C.	  Rea	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2011).	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insist that even these individuals are uninformed about the issue, but this seems a difficult 
claim to maintain.87 
If, then, one is committed to the idea that belief in God is imminently reasonable 
and if she also recognizes that there are in fact intelligent and informed people who deny 
God’s existence, she is left with only one other option: intelligent people who deny the 
existence of God do so because they are intellectually dishonest. That is, one could solve 
the inconsistent set by denying proposition III. This is perhaps an enticing solution, since 
it allows one to maintain that belief in God is imminently reasonable and that there are 
well-informed individuals who nonetheless deny the existence of God. This way of 
solving the inconsistent set accounts for non-belief by claiming that there are some 
ulterior motives that cloud the judgment of those who deny the existence of God so that, 
despite having access to the relevant evidence for the existence of God, they consciously 
or subconsciously desire that God does not exist, which results in wrongly propping up 
some arguments while disregarding others. On this view, non-believers wish that God did 
not exist and so seek out the evidence to confirm their predeterminations and ignore 
evidence to the contrary.  
There are, however, certain problems with this way of solving the inconsistent set. 
First, it is not demonstrable. No one could show that every intelligent person who denies 
the existence of God does so out of extreme bias or bad motives; after all, I only have 
access to my own motives and no one else’s.88 By Warren’s own standards, then, he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87.	  It	  has	  been	  brought	  to	  my	  attention	  by	  Matt	  Hale	  that	  there	  are	  reasonable	  ways	  one	  might	  argue	  that	  atheism	  is	  necessarily	  irrational.	  However,	  as	  Hale	  made	  the	  case,	  this	  argument	  is	  predicated	  on	  a	  different	  definition	  of	  rationality	  than	  Warren’s.	  At	  least	  on	  Warren’s	  definition	  of	  rationality,	  my	  claim	  stands.	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could not know that bad motives are the reason that atheists deny the existence of God. 
He may have suspicion that it is the case—he might strongly believe it—but he could not 
know it. Second, it cuts against experience. While no doubt there are some atheists that 
are intellectually dishonest as it relates to belief in God, others are deeply motivated to 
understand the ultimate truths of the universe as objectively as possible. There are even 
some atheists who are biased in the opposite direction; they were once devoutly religious 
but who, despite wishes to the contrary, simply cannot find it in them to believe in God 
anymore. It is plausible, I suppose, to insist that atheists are subconsciously biased 
against belief in God, even if they do not realize it. This, it seems, is the only way to 
maintain that belief in God is imminently reasonable despite the fact that some continue 
to doubt the existence of God. But if one believes that there is at least one atheist (or even 
agnostic, for that matter) that is both intelligent and intellectually honest who does not 
believe in God, he can only conclude that belief in God is not imminently reasonable. 
So what does it mean if belief in God is not imminently reasonable? First, it 
should be noted that belief in God may still be reasonable; it just might not be imminently 
reasonable. That is, there may be good arguments for the existence of God, but it may not 
be the case that those arguments are so overwhelmingly obvious that just anyone would 
accept them upon consideration. Perhaps there are even good arguments for atheism or 
agnosticism; there could be certain individuals with a particular set of experiences and 
expertise whereby they are within their epistemic rights in accepting non-belief.89 In this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88.	  And	  sometimes	  I	  am	  not	  even	  aware	  of	  my	  own	  motivations.	  They	  are	  sometimes	  accessibly	  only	  through	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  self-­‐reflection	  and	  soul	  searching.	  	  	  89.	  For	  example,	  I	  imagine	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  Jews	  that	  suffered	  through	  the	  Holocaust	  would	  have	  been	  within	  their	  epistemic	  rights	  to	  deny	  the	  existence	  of	  God	  based	  on	  their	  circumstances	  and	  the	  inordinate	  amount	  of	  evil	  they	  had	  experienced	  during	  that	  time.	  That	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  they	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case, there may be good arguments on both sides of the debate about God. Maybe the 
weight of the evidence objectively leans in favor of one view or the other, but at the least, 
there are compelling arguments on both sides to consider. Furthermore, the weight of the 
evidence may not lean so heavily in one direction so as to make the issue unquestionably 
obvious. On the one hand, the upshot here is this way of thinking provides an account for 
why there is widespread disagreement among those who are reasoned and intellectually 
honest who have considered the issue of the existence of God. The downside, on the 
other hand, is that if there are indeed good arguments on both sides, belief in God is not 
imminently reasonable. This is a problem because, on Warren’s epistemology, if belief in 
God is not imminently reasonable, it cannot count as knowledge. If knowledge must be 
certain but the belief that God exists is not imminently reasonable, then the necessary 
result is agnosticism.  
This is perhaps a practical dilemma as much as it is a philosophical one. It is an 
open secret in the Churches of Christ that there is a significant chance that a member will 
enter college as a Christian but leave it as an unbeliever.90 There are no doubt many 
factors for this change, including social pressure and the intellectual climate on college 
campuses (among others), but it is worth considering if there are also epistemological 
reasons for this trend. If a person operates with Warren’s epistemology, he may believe 
that belief in God is not just reasonable, but imminently reasonable. However if he 
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  objectively	  should	  have	  rejected	  belief	  in	  God	  based	  on	  all	  the	  possible	  evidence	  (indeed,	  many	  maintained	  belief	  in	  God),	  but	  it	  seems	  they	  at	  least	  had	  access	  to	  some	  good	  reasons	  to	  do	  so	  based	  on	  their	  experiences.	  	  90.	  According	  to	  a	  2014	  “Religious	  Landscape	  Study”	  by	  Pew	  Research,	  only	  forty-­‐five	  percent	  of	  those	  raised	  in	  a	  “Restorationist”	  church	  still	  identify	  as	  a	  member.	  Fifteen	  percent	  consider	  themselves	  religiously	  unaffiliated.	  See	  http://www.pewforum.org/2015/05/12/chapter-­‐2-­‐religious-­‐switching-­‐and-­‐intermarriage/pr_15-­‐05-­‐12_rls_chapter2-­‐04	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virtuous, he is faced with the dilemma described above. He must either discover evidence 
that the non-believer(s) is uninformed or intellectually dishonest, or he must reject that 
belief in God is imminently reasonable. And it does not stop there. Even if he does not 
know any non-believers, if he so much as judges an argument against the existence of 
God to hold considerable weight, he will no longer be able to hold onto his belief that 
belief in God is imminently reasonable. Consequently, if he maintains his epistemology 
except for the belief that belief in God is imminently rational, he will be forced to 
conclude that no one can actually know God exists; he will be resigned to agnosticism.91 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
  There are, I have argued, serious problems with certain aspects of Warren’s 
epistemology. When examined critically, Warren’s definition of knowledge as 
indubitable, his combination of internalism and foundationalism, and his claim that belief 
in God is imminently rational, all ultimately result in agnosticism. At best, one may 
strongly believe in God, but by Warren’s own epistemology, he could not have 
knowledge about his convictions. Still worse, he could not know anything. The problems 
with Warren’s epistemology are so critical that they result not just in agnosticism but also 
in radical skepticism. Despite these fatal problems, however, other aspects of Warren’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91. Given the argument I have made, there remains a rather glaring counter-argument: If Warren’s 
epistemology leads to skepticism, why wasn’t Warren, who was clearly pressed on all sides to substantiate 
his epistemological claims, a skeptic? The answer to this is complicated, but I think there are at least a 
couple of helpful responses. First, I am not arguing that Warren’s epistemology necessarily leads to 
skepticism in particular, subjective cases. That is, that there are many who hold to Warren’s epistemology 
(or something similar) and still believe in God has no bearing on my argument. I have only argued that 
Warren’s epistemology is logically inconsistent. Whether anyone subjectively realizes this or not is of no 
significance to its objective truth or not. Second, while it is true that Warren was pressed on all sides 
evidentially to defend the existence of God, it is not clear to me that he was ever pressed to defend his more 
foundational epistemological assumptions. Warren’s internalist foundationalism was entirely standard in 
his day amongst both theists and atheists. That epistemological framework, as far as I can tell, was never 
challenged; what was challenged was only the evidence for the existence of God. What Warren’s response 
would have been to challenges to his actual framework can only be guessed at.  
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epistemology are quite strong. Additionally, the last fifty years of epistemology have seen 
a surge of interest in accounting for knowledge of God, which has resulted in new and 
philosophically interesting ways of achieving this task. Therefore, the time is ripe to 
imagine new alternatives in religious epistemology by mining Warren’s epistemology for 
its strengths and incorporating them into the recent philosophical advancements in 
religious epistemology. Is there a way to preserve the strengths of Warren’s epistemology 
but avoid its pitfalls by engaging with these recent philosophical developments? It is to 
these questions that we now turn.
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CHAPTER IV 
 
A WAY FORWARD IN RELIGIOUS EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 I have argued in this thesis that the epistemology of Thomas B. Warren should be 
understood as a version of internalist foundationalism; a person’s belief counts as 
knowledge if she is aware of good reasons for holding the belief, if she has fulfilled her 
epistemic obligation to honor the law of rationality, if the antecedent beliefs on which it 
is based are themselves justified and ultimately founded on a basic, self-evident belief, 
and if the belief is formed in such a way that it could not possibly be wrong. If pressed, 
however, Warren’s epistemology results in skepticism in general and agnosticism in 
particular. Given this problem, it seems there is a need to re-think religious epistemology. 
Such an epistemology ought to utilize the strengths of Warren’s epistemology but avoid 
its pitfalls. Fortunately, the time is ripe for this sort of project. There has recently been a 
surge of interest among epistemologists in accounting for knowledge of God in a 
philosophically and theologically robust way. It is therefore the task of this chapter to 
point the way forward for such a project by highlighting some strengths of Warren’s 
epistemology as well as by drawing attention to new developments in epistemology that 
may aid in sufficiently accounting for knowledge of God. Toward this end, the chapter 
proceeds as follows. The first section underscores particular strengths of Thomas B. 
Warren’s epistemology that ought to be considered in a fully elaborated religious
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epistemology. The second section draws attention to new developments in epistemology 
that may aid in accounting for knowledge of God. Finally, the third section concludes the 
chapter and the thesis by looking ahead to the future of religious epistemology and by 
making closing remarks that aim to capture the trajectory of this thesis as a whole. 
 
4.2 The Strengths of Warren’s Epistemology 
 Despite the weakness spelled out in chapter 3, Warren’s epistemology also has 
decided strengths. The first of these that I will highlight is Warren’s emphasis on the 
moral aspect of the intellectual life. For Warren, what one believes and how one behaves 
intellectually is not just an epistemic issue, but also a moral one.92 A person is morally 
obligated to fulfill her epistemic duty; that is, she must do her due diligence in drawing 
conclusions, she should behave only as is intellectually permissible, and she ought to be 
in no way blameworthy for any epistemic wrongdoing. The epistemic component of these 
obligations is that if these obligations are not fulfilled, one’s belief cannot count as 
knowledge. But the moral component is that, according to Warren, if these obligations 
are not fulfilled, one is not pleasing to God.93 There may be philosophical reasons to deny 
that these obligations are a necessary criterion of knowledge, but the impulse to connect 
the intellectual life with morality is a good one.94 Indeed, Warren may have been ahead 
of the curve in this respect. A growing sub-discipline of epistemology known as 
responsiblist virtue epistemology has developed out of an interest to explore the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92.	  See	  footnote	  35	  	  93.	  See	  footnote	  34	  	   94.	  For	  a	  fully	  elaborated	  rejection	  of	  the	  view	  that	  a	  person	  must	  necessarily	  fulfill	  his	  epistemic	  obligations	  in	  order	  for	  his	  belief	  to	  count	  as	  knowledge,	  see	  Alvin	  Plantinga,	  Warrant:	  The	  
Current	  Debate	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1993):	  1-­‐51.	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connection between the intellectual life and morality.95 Epistemologists have sought to 
account for intellectual virtue by paralleling and/or drawing from accounts of moral 
virtue,96 others have explored whether or in what way moral virtues may contribute to the 
formation of true beliefs,97 and some have considered whether there is an ethical 
dimension to knowledge and whether a person can be wronged qua knower.98  
This connection between moral and intellectual virtue may even bear particularly 
strongly on religious epistemology. Certain intellectual virtues may be more important in 
perceiving the divine than they are in perceiving the natural world. Open-mindedness to 
belief in God, for example, may be essential (or at least important) for one to be in a 
position to know God.99 And in contrast, there may be negative noetic consequences 
associated with immoral activity; sinful behavior may impair one’s ability to come to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   95.	  See	  Jason	  Baehr,	  “Virtue	  Epistemology,”	  Internet	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Philosophy,	  accessed	  May	  20,	  2016,	  http://www.iep.utm.edu/virtueep/;	  John	  Greco,	  “Virtues	  in	  Epistemology,”	  Oxford	  
Handbook	  of	  Epistemology,	  ed.	  Paul	  Moser	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2002).	  	  96.	  See	  Jason	  Baehr,	  The	  Inquiring	  Mind:	  On	  Intellectual	  Virtues	  and	  Virtue	  Epistemology	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2011);	  Robert	  Campbell	  Roberts	  and	  W.	  Jay	  Wood,	  Intellectual	  
Virtues:	  An	  Essay	  in	  Regulative	  Epistemology	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  2007);	  Linda	  Trinkaus	  Zagzebski,	  Virtues	  of	  the	  Mind:	  An	  Inquiry	  Into	  the	  Nature	  of	  Virtue	  and	  the	  Ethical	  Foundations	  of	  
Knowledge	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1996);	  Heather	  D.	  Battaly,	  ed.	  Virtue	  and	  Vice,	  
Moral	  and	  Epistemic,	  (Chichester:	  Wiley-­‐Blackwell,	  2010).	  	  97.	  See	  Jason	  Baehr,	  “Character	  Virtue,	  Knowledge,	  and	  Epistemic	  Agency:	  a	  Debate	  with	  Ernest	  Sosa”,	  Current	  Controversies	  in	  Virtue	  Theory,	  ed.	  Mark	  Alfano	  (Routledge,	  2015):	  74-­‐87;	  Michael	  R.	  DePaul	  and	  Linda	  Trinkaus	  Zagzebski,	  eds.	  Intellectual	  Virtue:	  Perspectives	  from	  Ethics	  and	  
Epistemology	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon,	  2003);	  Guy	  Axtell,	  ed.	  Knowledge,	  Belief,	  and	  Character:	  Readings	  in	  
Virtue	  Epistemology,	  Studies	  in	  Epistemology	  and	  Cognitive	  Theory	  (Lanham:	  Rowman	  &	  Littlefield	  Publishers,	  2000);	  Michael	  Brady	  and	  Duncan	  Pritchard,	  ed.	  Moral	  and	  Epistemic	  Virtues	  (Malden:	  Blackwell	  Publishing,	  2003).	  	  98.	  See	  Miranda	  Fricker,	  Epistemic	  Injustice:	  Power	  and	  the	  Ethics	  of	  Knowing	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2007).	  	  99.	  See	  Paul	  K.	  Moser,	  The	  Elusive	  God:	  Reorienting	  Religious	  Epistemology	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2008).	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knowledge of God.100 Selfishness, pride, hatred, vanity and obstinacy may all be 
significant obstacles in the pursuit of knowledge of God in a way that they are not for the 
pursuit of, say, science. The connection between morality and knowledge of God has not 
been fully cashed out, but this line of inquiry is ripe for exploration. Given this intuitive 
connection, therefore, it is worthwhile to continue in the tradition of Warren’s 
epistemology concerning the connection between the moral and intellectual life.  
Another of Warren’s strengths is his attention to theological prolegomena. Of 
foremost importance to Warren is the clear elaboration of his theological and 
epistemological presumptions.101 He puts every effort into clearly defining his theological 
resources, his method of interpretation, and his foundational beliefs. In turn, this clarity 
allows Warren to streamline his apologetic method. If one disagreed with Warren’s 
views, Warren had a way of getting at the essence of the disagreement. For example, if 
there was a disagreement about the nature of divorce, Warren would seek to understand 
what assumptions motivated his interlocutor’s disagreement (e.g., a different method of 
interpreting the Bible, differing views about appropriate theological resources, etc.) and 
then debate the merits of those assumptions, rather than just the result of those 
assumptions (e.g., a certain view of divorce).102 Because Warren had such a clear view of 
his own interpretive method and theological resources, he was consequently better 
equipped to identify when someone differed from him on those core starting points. This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   100.	  Alvin	  Plantinga,	  Warranted	  Christian	  Belief,	  199-­‐240	  	  101.	  By	  “presumption”	  I	  do	  not	  mean	  that	  his	  epistemological	  beliefs	  are	  unfounded	  or	  unreasoned.	  I	  only	  mean	  to	  indicate	  that	  some	  of	  Warren’s	  beliefs	  are	  more	  foundational	  than	  others	  and	  that	  he	  always	  sought	  to	  defend	  these	  foundational	  beliefs	  thoroughly	  before	  proceeding	  onto	  others.	  	   102.	  For	  an	  example	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  engagement,	  see	  Roy	  Deaver,	  ed.	  The	  Warren-­‐Fuqua	  
Debate.	  Fort	  Worth:	  J.	  E.	  Snelson	  Printing	  Co.,	  1955.	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is a considerable strength in the way Warren went about his religious epistemology and is 
regrettably missing from many contemporary religious epistemologies and theologies. 
Many would do well to learn from Warren’s example. 
A final strength to be gleaned from Warren’s epistemology is his foundationalism. 
A significant majority of contemporary epistemologists endorse at least a modest version 
of Warren’s foundationalism.103 That is, it is generally accepted that at least some beliefs 
can be properly basic and that any subsequent justified beliefs must ultimately be 
founded upon those properly basic beliefs.104 This is a good starting point for religious 
epistemology. While there is a disagreement about which beliefs can count as properly 
basic, there is at least a general consensus that foundationalism is the right view about the 
structure of knowledge. This means that instead of being lost in a debate about 
foundationalism, coherentism, or any other competing theories about the structure of 
knowledge, one can focus on which beliefs count as properly basic and how other 
inferential beliefs may relate to them in accounting for knowledge of God. It may even be 
that foundationalism as the basis of religious epistemology offer promising avenues in 
accounting for knowledge of God.105 This direction of inquiry has drawn more interest of 
late, but there is still much left to explore.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  103.	  For	  a	  distinction	  regarding	  modest	  foundationalism,	  see	  footnote	  77.	  As	  Michael	  Bergmann	  puts	  it,	  “Almost	  all	  epistemologists	  endorse	  the	  following	  foundationalist	  thesis:	  There	  can	  be	  noninferentially	  justified	  beliefs,”	  Justification	  Without	  Awareness,	  184.	  	   104.	  For	  a	  full	  defense	  of	  foundationalism,	  see	  Michael	  Bergmann,	  “Foundationalism,”	  in	  The	  
Oxford	  Handbook	  of	  the	  Epistemology	  of	  Theology,	  ed.	  William	  Abraham	  and	  Frederick	  Aquino	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  forthcoming);	  James	  van	  Cleve,	  “Why	  Coherence	  Is	  Not	  Enough:	  A	  Defense	  of	  Moderate	  Foundationalism,”	  Contemporary	  Debates	  in	  Epistemology,	  ed.	  Matthias	  Steup	  and	  Ernest	  Sosa	  (Oxford:	  	  Blackwell):	  168-­‐80.	  	   105.	  These	  possibilities	  have	  been	  of	  particular	  interest	  of	  the	  burgeoning	  field	  of	  Reformed	  epistemology.	  See	  Alvin	  Plantinga,	  Warranted	  Christian	  Belief;	  Plantinga,	  “On	  Reformed	  Epistemology,”	  Reformed	  Journal	  32,	  no.	  1	  (1982):	  13-­‐17;	  William	  Alston,	  Perceiving	  God:	  The	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4.3 New Directions in Epistemology 
 Certain aspects of Warren’s epistemology may benefit future projects that seek to 
adequately account for knowledge of God, but there are other tools that may aid in this 
task as well. Namely, there has been a growing interest in exploring how religious 
epistemology benefits from the interaction of theology and philosophy. Religious 
epistemology, despite being “religious” and “epistemology,” has not always been an 
interdisciplinary enterprise. The following overstatement might help make the point: in 
the past, religious epistemology has either been strictly theological or strictly 
philosophical. The theologian would conceive of knowledge of God using theological 
resources, but without much consideration of or interaction with philosophical projects, 
and visa versa, the philosopher would conceive of religious epistemology through the 
lens of philosophy and/or epistemology, but without paying much attention to the 
theologian. The reason for this distance, so the thinking goes, is that theology and 
philosophy should be taken on their own terms, and to combine one with the other would 
be to reduce both to their lowest common denominator and instead of mutual 
enhancement, this adulteration would ensure mutual ruin. This chasm can perhaps most 
notably be seen in two intellectual contemporaries: theologian Karl Barth with his 
categorical rejection of natural theology and philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein with the 
logical positivism that followed in the wake of his work. While there are historical 
reasons for such a divide, the distance between these disciplines has outrun its usefulness. 
It is therefore the goal of this section to highlight recent developments in epistemology 
that make interdisciplinary work between theology and philosophy possible. These new 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Epistemology	  of	  Religious	  Experience (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993);	  James K. Beilby, 
Epistemology as Theology: An Evaluation of Alvin Plantinga's Religious Epistemology, Ashgate New 
Critical Thinking in Religion, Theology, and Biblical Studies (Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate, 2005).	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directions in epistemology open untapped potential for theology and philosophy to 
mutually benefit from each other and together provide new and effective ways to account 
for knowledge of God.  
 
4.3.1 The Turn from the Project of Vindication to the Project of Explanation 
Epistemology has changed substantially over the past fifty years.106 Two recent 
developments in epistemology are particularly relevant to the interests of this chapter. 
The first of these developments is a shift in epistemology from what John Greco has 
identified as the project of vindication towards the project of explanation.107 The project 
of explanation is concerned with explaining what knowledge is.108 It asks questions such 
as the following. What is knowledge? What do we intuitively count as knowledge under 
ordinary circumstances? What are the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge? 
And how does knowledge differ from mere true belief? These questions are by no means 
original to twenty-first century epistemology; questions like these were raised by the likes 
of Socrates and Aristotle, but at least since Descartes’ Meditations until only recently, 
epistemology (and especially religious epistemology) has been dominated by the project 
of vindication.109 The project of vindication is to prove that we do indeed have 
knowledge, or, in the case of the skeptic, to show that we do not have knowledge.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  106.	  These	  changes	  have	  been	  sparked	  due	  largely	  in	  part	  to	  Edmund	  Gettier’s	  “Is	  Justified	  True	  Belief	  Knowledge?”	  Analysis	  23,	  no.	  6	  (1963),	  121-­‐23,	  which	  challenged	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  epistemology	  of	  his	  day.	  	  107.	  See	  John	  Greco,	  “Religious	  Knowledge	  in	  the	  Context	  of	  Conflicting	  Testimony,”	  
Proceedings	  of	  the	  American	  Catholic	  Philosophical	  Association,	  83	  (2009):	  61-­‐76.	  	   108.	  These	  projects	  also	  relate	  to	  Alvin	  Plantinga’s	  distinction	  between	  the	  de	  jure	  question	  and	  the	  de	  facto	  question	  regarding	  knowledge	  of	  God	  in	  Warranted	  Christian	  Belief,	  vii-x.	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One reason this recent turn from the project of vindication to the project of 
explanation is important is because it disentangles epistemology from the constraints of 
skepticism. The project of vindication demands a non-circular defense of knowledge in 
such a way that does not at any point presuppose knowledge in the course of its 
vindication.110 This constraint that the project of vindication must be non-circular stems 
from its fundamental connection to skepticism; for the skeptic, to presuppose knowledge 
in order to demonstrate that we have knowledge would be to beg the very question at 
issue. But this constraint virtually dooms epistemology to skepticism from the outset. 
How is it possible, for example, to demonstrate the reliability of sense perception without 
appealing to sense perception itself?111 Or, to take another example, how would one 
demonstrate the truthfulness of the proposition “2+2=4” without employing the 
knowledge one has of mathematics? If these pursuits are indeed futile, then why would a 
non-circular defense of knowledge be desirable in the first place? Many epistemologists 
now conclude it isn’t. Consequently, the resulting shift towards the project of explanation 
is not concerned with non-circular explanations, and so is not necessarily constrained by 
the concerns of skepticism.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  109.	  In	  Plato’s	  Meno,	  Socrates	  contemplates	  the	  difference	  between	  “knowledge”	  and	  “true	  opinion.”	  In	  Theaetetus,	  Socrates	  asks,	  “What	  is	  knowledge?”	  Aristotle	  inquires	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  knowledge	  as	  well	  in	  Metaphysics.	  	  110.	  John	  Greco,	  “Religious	  Knowledge	  in	  the	  Context	  of	  Conflicting	  Testimony,”	  Proceedings	  
of	  the	  American	  Catholic	  Philosophical	  Association,	  vol.	  83	  (2009):	  69.	  He	  writes	  that	  the	  Project	  of	  Vindication	  “demands	  a	  ‘fully	  general	  and	  non-­‐circular’	  vindication	  of	  the	  knowledge	  we	  claim	  to	  have.	  Such	  a	  vindication	  must	  be	  ‘fully	  general’	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  must	  cover	  all	  the	  knowledge	  we	  claim	  to	  have.	  It	  must	  be	  ‘non-­‐circular’	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  does	  (sic)	  not	  presuppose	  that	  knowledge	  in	  the	  course	  of	  its	  vindication.”	  	   111.	  This	  question	  is	  addressed	  extensively	  by	  William	  P.	  Alston	  in	  Perceiving	  God:	  The	  
Epistemology	  of	  Religious	  Experience	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press	  1993).	  Alston	  ultimately	  concludes	  it	  is	  not	  possible.	  
	   	   	   	  
60	  
The implications of this shift substantially change the landscape of religious 
epistemology. Before, to vindicate knowledge of God, one first had to demonstrate from 
premises anyone could accept that knowledge is possible and then that certain 
propositions, when taken together, are so convincing that God exists as to be indubitable. 
Thomas B. Warren’s epistemology is an excellent example of this methodological 
approach. His strategy was to build an argument for the existence of God, answer any and 
all objections to his argument, and refute arguments against the existence of God. In so 
doing, Warren believed his arguments to be so impenetrable and his critiques of atheism 
to be so devastating as to make belief in God imminently reasonable. Among Christian 
apologists of his time, Warren is certainly not unique in this approach. Within the project 
of vindication, these dialectic maneuvers make good sense; if Warren were correct that 
belief in God really is imminently reasonable, this would be enough to show that 
knowledge of God is indeed attainable. But as it turns out, this epistemological strategy 
results in skepticism.  
If the goal is explanation rather than vindication, however, where the skeptical 
constraint of non-circular accounts is absent, new and philosophically interesting 
accounts of knowledge of God become possible. William J. Abraham’s book, Crossing 
the Threshold of Divine Revelation, is an example of just this strategy.112 In it, Abraham 
argues that “divine revelation exists and that our possession of such revelation constitutes 
knowledge.”113 Furthermore, Abraham does not develop a general theory of knowledge 
and then test how Christian belief fares on his model, as would have been expected when 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  112.	  William J. Abraham, Crossing the Threshold of Divine Revelation (Grand Rapids: William 
B. Eerdmans Pub. 2006). 	  113.	  Ibid.,	  5.	  Besides	  an	  experience	  of	  divine	  revelation	  counting	  as	  knowledge,	  Abraham	  later	  adds,	  “I	  also	  think	  belief	  in	  divine	  revelation	  can	  also	  be	  both	  rational	  and	  justified.”	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the project of vindication dominated religious epistemology; he instead begins from a 
particular view of divine revelation and then goes on to show how such a view can be 
epistemically justifiable by utilizing recent work in analytic epistemology. Abraham’s 
account is therefore fundamentally and particularly Christian but also philosophically 
robust. In terms of the project of vindication, which demands a fully general and non-
circular defense of knowledge, Abraham’s methodological approach might be deemed 
fundamentally wrongheaded, however this is not necessarily the case if the aim of the 
project is explanation. 114 Only on the project of explanation rather than the project of 
vindication would this approach be considered legitimate.115 In short, Abraham’s book, 
Crossing the Threshold of Divine Revelation, represents the sort of new methodological 
possibilities in religious epistemology resulting at least partially from the shift from the 
project of vindication to the project of explanation. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  114.	  In	  fact,	  Abraham	  notices	  just	  this	  point:	  “If	  there	  are	  serious	  difficulties	  in	  the	  standard	  strategy	  (the	  project	  of	  vindication,	  as	  Greco	  calls	  it),	  it	  is	  time	  to	  look	  for	  an	  alternative.	  What	  I	  propose	  is	  quite	  simple.	  Let	  us	  reverse	  the	  way	  we	  proceed.	  Rather	  than	  securing	  a	  method	  and	  then	  seeing	  what	  results	  it	  gives	  us,	  let	  us	  identify	  a	  particular	  brand	  of	  theism	  and	  then	  ask	  what	  would	  be	  the	  appropriate	  way	  to	  adjudicate	  its	  intellectual	  status.”	  Ibid.,	  13.	  	  115.	  Consider	  what	  James	  Beilby	  writes	  about	  Alvin	  Plantinga’s	  methodology	  in	  Warranted	  
Christian	  Belief,	  “Obviously,	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  a	  methaphysical	  naturalist	  (or	  even	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  methodological	  naturalist),	  Plantinga’s	  proposal	  is	  hopelessly	  misguided	  and	  woefully	  inadequate.	  Critics	  will	  undoubtedly	  point	  out	  that	  it	  is	  circular	  reasoning	  to	  invoke	  the	  Holy	  Spirit’s	  role	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  faith	  in	  any	  argument	  for	  the	  warrant	  of	  Christian	  beliefs.	  Of	  course,	  any	  attempt	  to	  argue	  for	  Christianity	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  an	  account	  that	  presupooses	  Christianity	  would	  be	  viciously	  circular.	  But	  Plantinga	  is	  shouldering	  no	  such	  task.	  It	  is	  not	  part	  of	  his	  project	  to	  argue	  for	  the	  truth	  of	  Christianity	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  premises	  deemed	  acceptable	  by	  all.	  In	  fact,	  Plantinga	  insists	  that	  such	  a	  project	  would	  be	  both	  unsuccessful	  and	  wrong-­‐headed.”	  Epistemology	  as	  Theology:	  
An	  Evaluation	  of	  Alvin	  Plantinga’s	  Religious	  Epistemology	  (Burlington,	  VT:	  Ashgate	  Publishing	  Company,	  2005),	  114.	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4.3.2 The Turn from Internalism to Externalism 
Another recent shift in epistemology is the turn from internalist accounts of 
knowledge to externalist ones. Knowledge has traditionally been defined as justified, true 
belief, where ‘justification’ was whatever property differentiated mere true belief from 
knowledge. In the past, there have been various accounts of what is entailed in 
‘justification,’ but nearly all of them involved a strong internalist component: the factors 
that justify true belief in a way that counts as knowledge are solely internal to the 
knower. In recent years, however, there has been a shift away from internalism. Instead, 
epistemology is now dominated by externalist accounts of knowledge. Externalists claim 
that there are relevant factors that contribute to knowledge that are external to the 
knower. Furthermore, unlike internalism, externalism about knowledge rejects that a 
person must have cognitive access to the grounds of her knowledge. Instead, externalist 
accounts emphasize the importance of factors outside the control of the knower, such as 
properly functioning faculties, a truth-conducive environment, and/or whether the belief 
is caused by the state of affairs that makes it true.116  
  Like the shift from the project of vindication to the project of explanation, the 
shift from internalism about knowledge to externalism has important consequences on 
religious epistemology. Whereas on internalism, questions about knowledge are 
concerned with the state of the subject (e.g. her past experience, what she can deduce 
necessarily, etc.), externalism raises different sorts of questions. In religious 
epistemology in particular, numerous questions become philosophically interesting on an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  116.	  For	  more	  extensive	  discussion	  of	  the	  differences	  of	  externalism	  and	  internalism,	  see	  Hilary	  Kornblith’s	  Epistemology:	  Internalism	  and	  Externalism	  (Malden,	  Massachusetts:	  Blackwell	  Publishers,	  2001)	  and	  Contemporary	  Debates	  in	  Epistemology	  (Chichester,	  UK:	  Wiley-­‐Blackwell,	  2013),	  324-­‐350.	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externalist account that focuses not only on the subject but also factors outside her control 
(i.e. external factors). Might humans have an innate faculty for perceiving the divine?117 
Are there characteristics of God that might be relevant to human persons gaining 
knowledge about him?118 What contribution might religious experience make towards 
achieving knowledge?119 On internalism, these questions are all philosophically 
uninteresting, but on externalism, they are potentially critical to a full account of 
knowledge of God. 
 An example will serve to demonstrate the difference this turn in epistemology 
makes. Alvin Plantinga’s general epistemology is a version of virtue epistemology that is 
based on proper function, which means it is an externalist model. This gives rise to his 
religious epistemology, which relies on what he calls his Aquinas/Calvin model. In short, 
Plantinga argues that it is not even necessary that a person’s beliefs about God be formed 
on the basis of reasons or evidence. Instead, according to Plantinga, it is conceivable that 
beliefs about God may arise naturally and spontaneously within us by the operation of the 
sensus divinitatis. For Plantinga, the sensus divinitatitis is a belief-forming faculty 
inherent to human persons, which, when functioning properly, spontaneously produces in 
them beliefs about God. It is easy to see how Plantinga’s religious epistemology is 
fundamentally informed by theological commitments, but these commitments only make 
sense on an externalist (as opposed to an internalist) account of knowledge, which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  117.	  See	  Alvin	  Plantinga,	  Warranted	  Christian	  Belief	  (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2000).	   	  118.	  See	  Paul	  Moser,	  The	  Elusive	  God:	  Reorienting	  Religious	  Epistemology	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2008).	  	  119.	  See	  William	  J.	  Abraham,	  Crossing	  the	  Threshold	  of	  Divine	  Revelation	  (Grand Rapids, 
Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Pub. 2006);	  William	  Alston,	  Perceiving	  God:	  The	  Epistemology	  of	  Religious	  
Experience	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1993).	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focuses on factors outside the control of the knower, such as the proper function and 
deliverances of the sensus divinitatis. 
 
4.4 The Emergence of “The Epistemology of Theology” 
 There are many ways forward for future accounts of religious epistemology. 
Strengths of Warren’s epistemology such as his foundationalism, his attention to 
theological prolegomena, and his connection between morality and epistemology all offer 
potential for accounting for knowledge of God. Additionally, recent developments in 
epistemology have opened new opportunities for addressing knowledge of God. One 
upshot of these developments is that theology and epistemology are not mutually 
exclusive enterprises. Whatever reasons for the divide between theology and philosophy 
in the past, it is clear that there is a growing interest in seeing the two interact again. The 
two examples given in this chapter of the recent developments in epistemology, William 
Abraham’s Crossing the Divine Threshold and Alvin Plantinga’s Warranted Christian 
Belief, are by a theologian and philosopher respectively. Far from relying only on 
theological or only on philosophical resources, both of these examples are explicit that 
each discipline stands much to gain from substantive dialogue. Furthermore, given the 
sorts of epistemological developments I have described, there is no a priori reason to 
reject or set aside theological commitments before one can conceive of a robust religious 
epistemology.120 
 The new possibilities afforded by the strengths of Warren’s epistemology and 
recent developments in contemporary epistemology are perhaps most prominently on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  120.	  William	  J.	  Abraham	  makes	  a	  similar	  claim	  in	  “Soft	  Rationalism,”	  Philosophy	  of	  Religion:	  
Selected	  Readings,	  Michael	  Peterson,	  William	  Hasker,	  Bruce	  Reichenbach,	  David	  Basinger,	  eds.	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1996):	  84-­‐93.	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display in the growing sub-discipline of the epistemology of theology. This discipline, 
which will be examined at length in the forthcoming Oxford Handbook of Epistemology 
of Theology, represents the collaborative work between theologians and philosophers that 
is ripe for exploration.121 As Frederick Aquino puts it in his proposal for the volume, 
“The boundaries between philosophy and theology have been transgressed in productive 
ways. This creates space for creative work in epistemology as it crops up within 
theology.”122 This does not mean that theologians must eat from the scraps that fall from 
the philosophers’ table, nor must the philosopher kowtow to the commitments of the 
theologian. But rather, it is worth asking if there are certain unexamined epistemological 
assumptions held by theologians and also whether certain theological resources might 
bolster philosophical accounts of religious epistemology. At least as it pertains to the 
epistemology of theology, theologians and philosophers are on an even playing field. 
Aquino again:  
We strive to make it clear in this volume that the Christian tradition encourages, 
rather than inhibits, the pursuit of epistemological questions. Along these lines, 
recent work in epistemology can help theologians make relevant distinctions and 
alert them to epistemic components in the Christian tradition that have been 
ignored, neglected, or not formulated adequately. When the epistemic proposals, 
insights, and suggestions embedded in the canonical heritage of the Christian 
tradition are brought to life, we hope that other theologians and philosophers will 
join us in pursuing these matters carefully, rigorously, and thoroughly.123 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  121.	  William	  Abraham	  and	  Frederick	  Aquino,	  ed.,	  The	  Oxford	  Handbook	  of	  the	  Epistemology	  
of	  Theology	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  forthcoming).	  	  122.	  Frederick	  Aquino	  and	  William	  Abraham,	  “The	  Oxford	  Handbook	  of	  the	  Epistemology	  of	  Theology,”	  on	  Academia,	  accessed	  May	  20,	  2016,	  https://www.academia.edu/4069912/The_Oxford_Handbook_of_the_Epistemology_of_Theology_eds._William_J._Abraham_and_Frederick_D._Aquino	  	   123.	  Ibid.	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In other words, the time is now ripe for new engagement between theology and 
philosophy, and it is precisely this sort of dialogue that may contribute to accounts of 
knowledge of God in new and profound ways.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
There is in the Churches of Christ a distinct culture of attention to epistemological 
concerns, such as how one can know that God exists, what hermeneutical principles 
ought to inform one’s reading of the Bible, and how one can know anything about God 
and his will for humankind. However, the epistemological framework that undergirds 
contemporary answers to these kinds of questions in the Churches of Christ has rarely, if 
ever, been examined. At least as they are expressed in the work of Thomas B. Warren, it 
turns out this standard epistemology in the Churches of Christ has fatal problems if the 
goal is accounting for knowledge of God. Fortunately, new perspectives in epistemology 
have paved the way for theologically and philosophically robust accounts of knowledge 
of God that have not before been expressed. That, combined with the strengths of 
Warren’s epistemology, provides potentially fruitful ways forward for religious 
epistemology. Disciplines such as the epistemology of theology have been devoted to 
exploring this uncharted territory, but there is much work left to do in order to explore all 
of the facets involved in knowing God. Long may the work continue.
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